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THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act (PRWORA), signed into law in 1996, transformed the U.S. welfare 
system. PRWORA replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) program with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). 
Since its inception in 1935 as part of the Social Security Act, AFDC had 
been the main welfare program providing assistance to low-income single 
mothers. But a number of factors, particularly the rapid growth in the 
never-married single-mother population and a resumption of growth in 
caseloads in the early 1990s (following the surge of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s; figure 1), rendered the program unpopular.' Under the new 
TANF program, welfare participation among single mothers has dropped 
dramatically, from 25 percent in 1996 to 9 percent today. At the same time, 
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1. Before PRWORA the AFDC program had undergone a number of overhauls as well 
as lesser changes. For instance, in 1961 the AFDC-Unemployed Parent program 
(AFDC-UP; a program that provided benefits to two-parent households) was created; in 
1967 the AFDC benefit reduction rate (the "tax" on wages earned while on welfare) was 
reduced to two-thirds from its original level of 100 percent; in 1981 the benefit reduction 
rate reverted to 100 percent; and in 1988 the Job Opportunities Program (JOBS) was cre- 
ated and AFDC-UP mandated in all states. See Garfinkel and McLanahan (1986) and 
Moffitt (2003) for historical accounts of the major developments in the AFDC program. 
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the fraction of single mothers who work has increased from 74 percent 
in 1996 to 79 percent today. The goal of this paper is to ascertain what fea- 
tures of welfare reform, if any, have been most responsible for this decline 
in welfare participation and increase in work among single mothers. 
Two factors complicate our task. First, a key feature of PRWORA was 
that it reduced federal authority over welfare policy, giving the states much 
greater leeway in the design of their own individual TANF programs. A 
great deal of program heterogeneity has emerged across states, making it 
difficult to develop a set of variables that comprehensively characterize the 
different state TANF programs. Second, a number of other recent develop- 
ments may also have contributed to the changes in welfare and work par- 
ticipation since 1996. These factors, such as the strong U.S. economy of 
1996-2000 and the significant expansion of the earned income tax credit 
(EITC) after 1993, must be controlled for in order to isolate the impact of 
particular elements of state TANF policies. 
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Figure 2. Unemployment and Welfare Participation among Single Mothers, 1980-2002 
Percent 








1985 1990 1995 2000 
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One important fact lends credence to the idea that factors other than 
PRWORA may account for the lion's share of recent caseload declines: the 
dramatic drop in welfare participation (and the dramatic increase in work) 
among single mothers actually began in 1993-94, before PRWORA's 
enactment (figure 2). From 1993 to 1996 AFDC participation fell from 
32 percent to 25 percent. On the other hand, beginning around 1993, many 
states began to obtain federal waivers allowing them to adopt TANF-like 
reforms of their AFDC programs. Such reforms included work requirements, 
time limits on benefits, sanctions for failure to meet work requirements, and 
family caps. These changes may have contributed substantially to caseload 
declines even before PRWORA. 
At the same time that PRWORA delegated greater control of welfare 
policy to the states, it also mandated nationwide many of the popular fea- 
tures introduced under state waivers, such as time limits and work require- 
ments. To understand the sense in which the federal law "mandates" 
certain features of state TANF programs, one must understand how federal 
4 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2004 
TANF funds are distributed to the states. Under AFDC, states received 
federal matching funds based on their AFDC expenditures. PRWORA 
converted these matching funds to block grants. The block grant for a state 
was fixed at a level related to federal funding of AFDC benefits and other 
related programs in the year when that funding had been highest in that 
state. States were given substantial leeway in how the block grant funds 
could be used: for example, they may use it to support child care (an impor- 
tant postreform development to which we will return). However, to avoid 
fiscal penalties on the federal block grant, states must adhere to a "main- 
tenance of effort" (MOE) rule: states must maintain their spending on 
assistance for needy families at no less than 75 to 80 percent of their pre- 
1996 level.2 
PRWORA requires that state TANF programs set a five-year lifetime 
limit for any individual receiving federally funded aid, although states 
may exempt up to 20 percent of their caseload from the limit. States may 
elect to set shorter time limits, and many have. However, any assistance 
provided to recipients beyond the five-year limit must be financed solely 
out of state funds. Three states (Michigan, New York, and Vermont) have 
effectively decided not to enforce the five-year limit. And many states 
(such as California) do not terminate but only reduce benefits when the 
time limit is reached. PRWORA also requires that a specific and rising 
percentage of states' TANF recipients either work or engage in work- 
related activities (such as job search or training), and that states impose a 
work requirement on any recipient who receives TANF for more than two 
years. Again, states may set a shorter work requirement time limit, and 
many have done so. States also vary greatly in the sorts of exemptions 
from work requirements that they allow and in the penalties they impose 
if work requirements are not satisfied. 
Roughly contemporaneously with the changes implemented by 
PRWORA, the U.S. economy experienced one of its longest postwar expan- 
sions. The national unemployment rate remained below 5 percent from 
1997 to 2001 and dropped as low as 4 percent in 2000 (figure 2). At 
about the same time, the EITC was dramatically expanded in terms of both 
the number of recipients and the generosity of the credit. Figure 3 shows 
2. Moreover, states may carry TANF funds over from fiscal year to fiscal year without 
limit. Although the use of carried-over funds is, in principle, more limited than same-year 
funds, in practice, the restrictions do not matter. 
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Figure 3. Families Receiving EITC and Aggregate Credits Received, 1975-2002a 
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that the number of federal EITC recipient families increased from about 
7 million in 1980 to 19.6 million in 2001. The federal EITC phase-in rate 
for a single mother with one child increased from 10 percent in 1980 to 
34 percent in 2002.3 Moreover, many states have enacted additional EITC 
programs of their own (for more details of the EITC expansion, see the 
discussion of the EITC under "Data" below). Other contemporaneous 
policy changes include the expansion of Medicaid under the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (OBRA 1989), which dramatically 
expanded health insurance coverage for low-income women and children 
who had not been receiving cash welfare benefits. Moreover, expenditure 
on the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) increased from 
$1.4 billion in 1992 to $7.9 billion in 2001 (figure 4). In fact, the value of 
3. The EITC increases in proportion to earned income at the phase-in rate until the 
credit reaches the (fixed) maximum amount. The credit starts to decrease at the phase-out 
rate when earned income exceeds another fixed threshold. 
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Figure 4. Expenditure on Child Care and Development Fund and Child Support 
Enforcement, 1978-2002 
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child care subsidies and other noncash benefits now exceeds cash assis- 
tance in total federal and state spending under TANF programs. The fed- 
eral and state governments have also substantially increased expenditure 
for child support enforcement (figure 4). Naturally, all of these changes 
in the economic and policy environment could affect the incentives of sin- 
gle mothers to participate in welfare or work. 
The changes in average yearly AFDC/TANF caseloads over the past 
several decades, depicted in figure 1, can be summarized as follows: 
-A steep increase in AFDC caseloads occurred in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, which were a time of enormous expansion in government 
public assistance programs, including the establishment of the food stamp 
and Medicaid programs. Moreover, between 1968 and 1971 the Supreme 
Court abolished the absent father rule, the residency requirement, and reg- 
ulations that denied aid to families with "employable mothers." These 
rulings increased the welfare take-up rate substantially. 
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-AFDC caseloads were almost flat from the early 1970s until 1990, 
with a mild increase in the early 1980s due to the back-to-back recessions 
of 1980 and 1981-82. The increase in the benefit reduction rate (the "tax" 
on wages earned while on welfare) from two-thirds to 100 percent during 
President Ronald Reagan's first term quickly stopped that uptick. 
-A dramatic increase in the caseload occurred from 1990 to 1994. 
This increase is puzzling because the 1990-91 recession was quite mild, 
and the 1988 Family Support Act had recently mandated that "work eligi- 
ble" AFDC recipients participate in welfare-to-work programs. Nor did 
the welfare participation rate of single mothers exhibit a steep increase 
(figure 2). We discuss various explanations for this phenomenon in our 
review of the literature below. 
-Welfare caseloads dropped spectacularly after the peak in 1994. 
The total caseload fell more than 60 percent from the peak of 1994 to 2002, 
a period roughly contemporaneous with the sustained economic expansion 
of 1992-2000. The recession that began in March 2001 did increase wel- 
fare caseloads in some states, but only slightly, and the national caseload 
showed a further slight decrease. 
How did the different components of welfare reform and other contem- 
poraneous economic and policy changes contribute to the spectacular 
drops, both in the welfare participation rate of single mothers and in wel- 
fare caseloads, that have occurred since 1993? What were the relative 
contributions of time limits, work requirements, the EITC, child care sub- 
sidies, and the strong macroeconomy? These are questions of immense 
importance for both policymakers and researchers. The answers matter 
for the design of improved welfare policies and for understanding how 
welfare policies should respond to macroeconomic conditions. 
Much research has already been devoted to these questions, and we 
review some of the key contributions to this literature in the next section. 
All of these have focused on only one or a few of the policy and economic 
variables of interest. Thus they are unable to measure the separate contri- 
butions of each of the elements mentioned above. Furthermore, we would 
argue, studies that focus on only a few policy variables may yield biased 
estimates of the effects of the policies in question, because they exclude 
other important policy and environmental factors. 
One of the main contributions of this paper is the construction of a 
detailed data set that includes measures of all the key economic and pol- 
icy elements described above, on a state-by-state and year-by-year basis, 
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for the entire 1980-2002 period. One concern in incorporating so many 
features in one grand analysis was the possible collinearity among the 
policies,4 many of which were implemented roughly contemporaneously. 
We deal with this problem by exploiting both cross-state variation in the 
timing and form of particular policies as well as cross-sectional variation 
in how individuals with different characteristics are affected differently 
by seemingly collinear policies. We discuss in detail the sources of varia- 
tion that we use to identify the effects of each variable of interest. 
The individual-level data that we use, in conjunction with the economic 
and policy variables we compiled ourselves, are those in the Annual Demo- 
graphics Supplement to the March Current Population Survey of the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census (March CPS).5 From the 1981-2003 supplements 
(which cover the period 1980-2002), we extracted data on all single 
mothers with dependent children, or, more specifically, women who were 
not living with a spouse at the time of the interview and who had at least 
one dependent child age 17 or younger. These women may be divorced, 
widowed, separated, or never married, and the children may be their bio- 
logical, step-, or adopted children as long as the mother could claim them 
as her dependents. Single-mother families are not necessarily single-adult 
families, since single mothers may be living with other adults, including, 
for example, their parents or their unmarried partners or other related or 
unrelated individuals.6 
We achieve two main goals in this paper. First, we show that, with a 
comprehensive list of control variables that include demographic, eco- 
nomic, and policy variables and a rich set of interaction terms, we are able 
to develop a model that rather successfully explains both the levels of and 
changes in welfare and work participation rates among single mothers 
across states, time, and various demographic groups for the whole 
1980-2002 period. Second, using simulations of the model, we estimate 
the contributions of the various components of welfare reform and other 
4. For instance, Grogger (2003a, p. 398) states, "Characterizing each reform is a diffi- 
cult enterprise, however, which in conjunction with significant collinearity issues leads me 
to take a somewhat less ambitious approach here." 
5. In 2003 the Census Bureau renamed the March CPS the Annual Social and Eco- 
nomic Study. 
6. Single women with dependent children have been the main recipients of benefits 
under both AFDC and TANF. Although single-parent families maintained by fathers, 
child-only families, and two-parent families where the primary earner is unemployed may 
also be eligible for benefits, single mothers account for a large majority of the caseload. 
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contemporaneous economic and policy changes to welfare and work par- 
ticipation rates. Of course, our confidence in our counterfactual decompo- 
sition relies, to a large degree, on the success of our empirical model in 
fitting the historical data on work and welfare participation rates. 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows: 
-The key economic and policy variables that contribute to the over- 
all 23-percentage-point decrease in the welfare participation rate among 
single mothers from 1993 to 2002 are, in order of relative importance, 
work requirements (accounting for 57 percent of the decrease), the EITC 
(26 percent), time limits (11 percent), and changes in the macroeconomy 
(7 percent). This ranking holds for all years since 1997, although the con- 
tributions of the different factors differ by demographic group. 
-The key economic and policy variables that contribute to the overall 
11.3-percentage-point increase in the work participation rate among sin- 
gle mothers from 1993 to 2002 are, in order of relative importance, the 
EITC (33 percent), macroeconomic changes (25 percent), work require- 
ments (17 percent), and time limits (10 percent). However, we find inter- 
esting differences in the relative importance of these variables across 
demographic subgroups and by time period. 
These findings have important policy implications. It seems that although 
work requirements are highly effective at getting single mothers off wel- 
fare, they are not as effective at getting them to work. Indeed, whether 
single mothers work or not after leaving welfare depends crucially on condi- 
tions in the macroeconomy. One big success in public policy has been the 
expansion of the EITC, which contributes significantly to both getting 
single mothers off welfare and getting them to work. Our research high- 
lights the crucial difference between "leaving welfare" and "working." 
Indeed, we document the somewhat troubling development that nearly 
one-quarter of welfare leavers actually did not start work. 
The paper is organized as follows. We begin with a selective critical 
review of some influential earlier studies. We then describe both the 
individual-level data from the March CPS and the economic and policy 
variables that we use in our empirical analysis. Next we give some 
descriptive statistics that emphasize the rich interactions between the eco- 
nomic and policy variables and the demographic characteristics of single 
mothers, and we use these to motivate our empirical model. Following a 
description of our empirical specification, we present and interpret our 
empirical estimates, discuss the fit of our empirical model, and use the 
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model to decompose the contributions of different economic and policy 
variables to changes in welfare and work participation rates. Finally, we 
draw conclusions and suggest directions for future research. 
A Selective Review of the Welfare Reform Literature 
In this section we discuss critically some of the key papers in the rele- 
vant literature and highlight the differences between their approaches and 
ours.7 
Studies on the Effects of Time Limits 
The aspect of the 1996 welfare reform that has received the greatest 
attention is the elimination of the entitlement status of welfare, and in par- 
ticular the imposition of time limits on welfare receipt. PRWORA created 
a five-year lifetime limit on TANF receipt, in the sense that, except in lim- 
ited special circumstances, states may not use federal funds to pay TANF 
benefits to any adult for more than a total of sixty months during that per- 
son's lifetime. But time limits did not originate with PRWORA. Many 
states had already instituted time limits on welfare receipt under federal 
waivers. Given the perceived centrality of time limits to the reform strat- 
egy, many studies have attempted to estimate the effects of time limits on 
welfare participation and other aspects of behavior. 
Notable studies of time limits include those of Jeffrey Grogger and 
Charles Michalopoulos.8 These papers exploit the fact that, under both 
AFDC and TANF rules, only families with children under 18 are eligible 
for benefits. Thus time limits should have no (direct) impact on the behav- 
ior of single mothers whose children would reach the age of 18 before the 
limit could come into play.9 Therefore, in a before-and-after design, any 
7. Many interesting and important papers are not discussed in this review. Grogger, 
Karoly, and Klerman (2002) and Blank (2002) provide extensive literature reviews. 
8. Grogger (2000, 2003a) and Grogger and Michalopoulos (2003). 
9. More generally, the strength of the incentive to conserve, or "bank," eligibility 
depends on the age of a woman's youngest child. If her youngest child is over 13, a newly 
imposed five-year time limit does not change her choice set at all. However, if her youngest 
child is under 13, then, the younger that child, the greater the option value of preserving 
welfare eligibility. Thus, ceteris paribus, time limits should enhance work incentives more 
for single mothers with younger children than for those with older children. Of course, time 
limits may also have indirect impacts. For instance, if time limits reduce welfare participa- 
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Table 1. Welfare Participation Rates of Single Mothers, by Age of Youngest Child 
Age of Before time After time Change 
youngest child lirnits" limits Percentage 
(years) (percent) (percent) points Percent 
0-6 41.3 23.8 -17.5 -42 
7-12 23.1 13.3 -9.8 -42 
13-17 16.0 11.0 -5.0 -31 
All 32.0 18.8 -13.2 -41 
Source: Reproduced from Grogger (2004, table 2). Data are from the March CPS from 1979 to 1999. 
a. The year when time limits were introduced varies from state to state. 
change in welfare participation among mothers with older children should 
be due solely to other time-varying factors besides the imposition of time 
limits (such as changes in general economic conditions or in other com- 
ponents of welfare reform). The change in participation rates for mothers 
with older children thus provides a baseline estimate of the impact of all 
these other factors. These mothers can therefore serve as a "control group" 
in estimating the effect of time limits. Under the assumption that all other 
time-varying factors affect the behavior of mothers with older and younger 
children in the same way, any incremental participation rate change among 
mothers with younger children isolates the effect of time limits. 
Table 1, which is adapted from one of Grogger's tables, illustrates this 
idea. 1 A five-year time limit should not have affected the behavior of sin- 
gle mothers whose youngest child was between 13 and 17 years old. Thus 
the drop in their participation rate from 16 percent to 11 percent should be 
attributable entirely to other time-varying factors, such as work require- 
ments or macroeconomic conditions. Next consider single mothers whose 
youngest child is 6 years old or less. These women are potentially affected 
by time limits, since they could use up the maximum five years of benefits 
long before their youngest child reaches age 18. Welfare participation 
dropped a much larger 17.5 percentage points among this group. Using 
these figures, we can estimate the impact of time limits using a difference- 
in-differences (DD) approach. Of the 1.7.5-percentage-point drop in par- 
ticipation for single mothers with young children, we attribute 5 percentage 
tion among other groups in society (such as mothers with younger children), this may 
increase the stigma of welfare participation, which would indirectly impact participation 
rates among mothers with older children. 
10. Grogger (2004). 
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points to the other factors besides time limits, since that is the change we 
observe for the control group. This leaves 12.5 percentage points as the drop 
in welfare participation attributable to time limits. This is a very substan- 
tial effect. It implies that 71 percent of the drop in welfare participation 
among mothers with young children was due to time limits. 
As Grogger hastens to point out, however, this estimate relies on a 
number of strong assumptions." Most critically, it supposes that all fac- 
tors other than time limits have the same impact on single mothers 
whether their children are older or younger. This is a very strong assump- 
tion, since mothers with younger children differ from mothers with older 
children in important ways. To see this, note that table 1 also shows that, 
both before and after time limits were imposed, welfare participation rates 
were much higher among single mothers with younger children (41 per- 
cent before time limits) than among those with older children (16 per- 
cent). This alone illustrates the dramatic difference between the two 
groups and calls into serious question the assumption that they would be 
affected in the same way by other aspects of welfare reform or by the 
business cycle. 
The fact that the baseline participation rates differ so greatly between 
the two groups creates another serious problem for the simple DD approach. 
Even if unmeasured time-varying factors did have a common impact 
across groups, to use a DD approach we need to know whether the "com- 
mon impact" applies when we measure impacts in levels or in percentages. 
This point is also illustrated in table 1. The last column shows the per- 
centage change in participation rates for each group following the imposi- 
tion of time limits. The single mothers with older children had a 31 percent 
decline in welfare participation, whereas those with younger children had 
a 42 percent decline. So, if one assumes that the unmeasured factors have 
a common percentage-change effect across groups, the DD estimate of the 
effect of time limits on mothers with younger children is 11 percentage 
points. This implies that only 26 percent of the drop in welfare participa- 
tion among this group of mothers was due to time limits. Thus time limits 
seem much less important when impacts are measured in percentages 
rather than levels.12 
11. Grogger (2004). 
12. To dramatize the possibility of this bias, consider the following thought experi- 
ment. Suppose that time limits had no effect on welfare participation, but that other, omit- 
ted factors (such as work requirements and work incentives) caused all single mothers to 
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We contend that there is only one way around this problem, and that is 
to do the hard work of trying to measure and control for a rich set of time- 
varying factors that may have affected people with different characteris- 
tics differently, and to allow for interactions between these factors and 
personal characteristics in constructing our model. The DD approach is 
not a panacea for dealing with unmeasured time-varying factors when the 
treatment and control groups are different, especially when they have dif- 
ferent baseline participation rates.'3 
Recognizing this, Grogger extends the simple DD analysis described 
above to control for four specific time-varying factors that he believed 
might have different effects on women with younger children than on 
those with older children. Those time-varying factors are the unemploy- 
ment rate, the minimum wage, the real level of welfare benefits (all mea- 
sured at the state level), and a dummy variable for "any statewide welfare 
reform."' 4 When these factors are controlled for, and state dummy vari- 
ables and state-specific quadratic time trends are included, the estimated 
impact of time limits on welfare participation for single mothers with 
children age 6 and under drops to 8.6 percentage points.15 This is still 
49 percent of the overall 17.5-percentage-point drop in participation for 
this group. 
Thus Grogger's results imply that time limits were a major factor 
driving down caseloads. His estimates of state unemployment rate effects 
are all insignificant, implying that the strong economy over the period did 
not play a significant role. His estimates do imply that falling real AFDC/ 
TANF benefits had a significant impact on mothers with younger chil- 
dren. Interestingly, neither the time limit dummy nor the general reform 
leave welfare. This would lead to a change of 41 percentage points for mothers with chil- 
dren 6 and under, and 16 percentage points for mothers with children ages 13 to 17. This 
would yield an estimate for the effect of time limits of 25 percentage points, when in real- 
ity the effect is zero. If instead it were known that the omitted factors operated on percent- 
age changes rather than levels, we would get changes of -100 percent for both the first 
group and the second, for a (correct) difference of zero. But of course we have no way to 
know in advance which specification-levels or percentage changes-is the right one. 
13. This criticism actually applies to many recent applications of the DD methodology, 
which have often involved situations where the "treatment" and "control" groups are rather 
different at baseline. 
14. Grogger (2004). 
15. We refer to the results in column 1 of table 5 in Grogger (2004), which we take to 
be his main results. 
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dummy nor the unemployment rate nor any of his other controls are sig- 
nificant for the single mothers with older children. Thus Grogger' s results 
apparently attribute the 31 percent drop in welfare participation for this 
group to the state-specific time trends. These may be picking up the effect 
of the EITC expansion, a general change in "culture," or some other fac- 
tor not controlled for in the model. Indeed, in a later paper that controlled 
for EITC expansion, Grogger found an even smaller effect of time limits 
on welfare participation: they now accounted for only about one-eighth of 
the decline in welfare use and about 7 percent of the rise in the employ- 
ment rate since 1993.16 This is rather close to our own estimates, pre- 
sented below, of 11 percent and 10 percent for the contributions of time 
limits to changes in welfare and work participation, respectively. 
An important limitation of Grogger' s approach is that all other aspects 
of welfare reform are summarized in his "any statewide welfare reform" 
dummy variable. This precludes him from estimating the effects of other 
specific policy changes. Furthermore, it will not adequately control for omit- 
ted factors if other reforms affect different demographic groups differently. 
As an example, one specific feature of welfare reform that Grogger omits, 
and which could lead to upward bias in his estimates of time limit effects, is 
the massive expansion of subsidized day care for low-income families 
that occurred largely as a result of PRWORA (figure 4). Under CCDF 
rules, funds may not be used to subsidize day care for children over 12 except 
in very rare instances (for example, for children with special needs). Hence 
the day care expansion should not have affected single mothers whose 
youngest child is 13 to 17 years old. And, obviously, subsidized day care 
could have a bigger effect on mothers with pre-school-aged children. That 
is, the effects of other contemporaneous reforms omitted from the analy- 
sis could indeed be age dependent. We note, somewhat facetiously, that if 
we chose to ignore time limits rather than day care, we could use table 1 
to obtain a DD estimate of the effect of expanded day care spending.'7 
16. Grogger (2003a). 
17. Using a structural model of welfare participation and labor supply estimated on 
data from the 1980s, Keane (1995) predicted that a policy of subsidizing single mothers' 
fixed costs of working (primarily day care and transport costs) would reduce their AFDC 
participation rate from 25 percent to 20.8 percent (a 17 percent decline) and increase their 
employment rate by 7 percentage points from a base rate of 60 percent. Thus our prior is 
that large effects of day care subsidies are plausible. 
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The later analysis of Grogger and Michalopoulos is less subject to 
these sorts of criticisms.'8 They estimate the effect of time limits using 
data from a randomized experiment, the Florida Family Transition Pro- 
gram. This was a fairly small experiment in which welfare recipients in 
Escambia County, Florida, were randomly assigned to either a treatment 
group that was subject to a two- or a three-year time limit or a control 
group that was not.19 They estimate that the two-year time limit reduced 
welfare participation rates among single mothers with youngest children 
ages 3 to 5 by 7.4 percentage points (from a base rate of 40.3 percent) dur- 
ing the first two years after the time limit was imposed. This estimate 
implies significant effects of time limits, but it is difficult to translate it 
into a prediction for the aggregate welfare caseload, for two reasons: first, 
the estimate is based on a two-year limit, whereas most states have longer 
limits; and second, it conditions on a sample of women who had applied 
for welfare in the first place. Thus it tells us nothing about how time lim- 
its would affect entry into welfare. 
Furthermore, we do not think it is possible to generalize the significant 
effects of time limits in the Florida context to the broader national context. 
Dan Bloom, Mary Farrell, Barbara Fink, and Diana Adams-Ciardullo 
(BFFA) provide an excellent discussion of how time limits have been 
implemented in practice in many states. They state that "as a relatively 
small pilot program ... [the Florida program] was generously funded and 
heavily staffed," and thus, "With small caseloads, workers were able to 
have frequent contact with participants."20 They go on to point out that 
"Recipients who came within six months of reaching their time limit and 
who were not employed were referred to specialized staff known as 
'transitional job developers,' who worked intensively to help these indi- 
viduals find jobs. The transitional job developers sometimes met with 
recipients several times a week, and they offered employers generous 
subsidies to hire their clients." Finally, BFFA note that ". . . nearly all of 
those who reached the time limit had their benefits fully cancelled. Very 
18. Grogger and Michalopoulos (2003). 
19. A confounding feature of this experiment was that a child care subsidy was also 
provided to both groups. Thus the experiment does not estimate the effect of time limits 
alone. However, assuming no interaction between child care subsidies and time limits, the 
differences between the treatment and the control groups should net out the effects of 
child care. 
20. Bloom and others (2002, p. 140). 
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few extensions were granted; only a handful of cases retained the child's 
portion of the grant; and no one was given a post-time limit subsidized 
job."21 
This combination of intensive case management and strict enforce- 
ment of the time limit is wildly at variance with the norms under TANF. 
In fact, BFFA describe a system where, in practice, time limits are only 
sporadically enforced because extensions and exemptions are so com- 
mon. They note that roughly 44 percent of the caseload reside in states 
such as Michigan, New York, and Vermont, which do not have time lim- 
its, or California, Maryland, and Washington, which only reduce (rather 
than terminate) benefits when the time limit is reached. Furthermore, sev- 
eral states, such as Oregon, stop the welfare time clock if a recipient is 
participating in required work or work-related activities, and many states, 
such as Connecticut, provide liberal extensions of the time limit if recipi- 
ents have made a "good faith effort," which basically means meeting the 
requirements of the state TANF plan with respect to work, job search and 
training, and avoiding sanctions. 
Thus, in many states, time limits are practically irrelevant. A typical 
comment is that of the U.S. General Accounting Office: "In Oregon, months 
count toward the time limit only if the family fails to cooperate, and the 
State has graduated sanctions resulting in a full family sanction for failure 
to participate [in required work activities]. Officials told us they do not 
expect any families to ever reach the State time limits in Oregon because, 
if families are cooperating, they can expect to receive cash assistance 
indefinitely (funded by the State after the waiver expires in the year 2002); 
if families are not cooperating, their grants will be terminated long before 
the time limit is reached."22 BFFA describe data on 54,148 TANF recip- 
ients who had reached the federal five-year time limit by December 2001. 
The bulk of these were in Michigan and New York, since these states 
implemented TANF relatively early on. But these states do not impose the 
federal limit. Of 5,143 recipients in the other states that did nominally 
impose time limits, BFFA report that 51 percent continued to receive 
TANF benefits under some sort of extension. The most common exten- 
sion criteria were "good faith effort" (in Connecticut, South Carolina, and 
Tennessee), "disabled or caring for disabled family member" (in Georgia, 
21. Bloom and others (2002, p. 142). 
22. U.S. General Accounting Office (1998a, p. 55). 
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Louisiana, and Utah), "to complete education or training" (in Georgia), 
"high unemployment" (in Texas), and "other" (in Ohio). 
Studies of Other TANF and TANF-Like Reforms 
A number of previous studies have attempted to look more broadly at 
the whole range of factors that might drive caseloads. A paper by Rebecca 
Blank was a pioneering effort in this direction.23 She examined the evolu- 
tion of welfare caseloads by state and by year over the period 1977-95. 
Although her data were entirely from the pre-TANF period, a number of 
states had already instituted waivers in the early 1990s, making it possible 
to examine the impact of a number of TANF-like reforms. 
The details of Blank's specification are worth describing, because they 
guide much of the subsequent work in this area. Her dependent variable is 
the log ratio of a state's AFDC caseload to the female population ages 15 
to 44. Given that most AFDC recipients are in this age range, the depen- 
dent variable can be taken to approximate the percentage of women in 
this age group who participate in AFDC. This variable ranged from 6 to 
8 percent over the sample period and was 7.4 percent in 1994. The policy 
variables include the state-specific AFDC "grant" for a family of three 
(that is, the benefit for a family with no earnings or outside income) and 
dummy variables for whether the state had been granted a waiver and, if 
so, whether the policies adopted under the waiver included time limits, 
enhanced work requirements, fewer exemptions from (or more severe 
sanctions for) failure to meet work requirements, or family caps. (A fam- 
ily cap is a policy whereby AFDC benefits are not increased by the usual 
per-child increment if a woman has an additional child while already on 
AFDC.) Controls for aggregate economic conditions were the state unem- 
ployment rate (and two lags of this variable), the median wage, and the 
20th percentile wage. Blank also controlled for state demographics such 
as average educational attainment, the share of the population that were 
black, the share that were elderly, the share that were recent immigrants, 
and the share of households headed by single females. 
Blank's results imply that caseloads are mildly sensitive to the un- 
employment rate: the estimated elasticity of the welfare participation rate 
with respect to a sustained increase in the unemployment rate is roughly 
23. Blank (2001). 
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0.25.24 This means that a 3-percentage-point increase in the unemploy- 
ment rate would raise the participation rate by about 11 percent after three 
years. Her results also imply that participation is quite sensitive to benefit 
levels: the estimated elasticity of the participation rate with respect to the 
benefit level is 0.56. 
Blank's study has a few notable shortcomings. First, a salient feature 
of the data (figure 1) is that the AFDC caseload was quite flat from 1977 
through 1989 (in the range of 3.5 million to 3.9 million families). But it 
rose sharply in the 1990-93 period (from 3.8 million in 1989 to 5.0 mil- 
lion in 1993), peaked in March 1994 at 5.1 million families, and then 
began to drop sharply in mid-1994. One might suspect that the bulge was 
due to the mild recession of the early 1990s. Before 1990, however, AFDC 
caseloads had never exhibited much cyclical sensitivity. In fact, Blank 
shows that half of the caseload increase in 1990-94 was due to increases 
in child-only and AFDC-UP cases.25 Thus her dependent variable exag- 
gerates the increase in the AFDC participation rate among single females 
age 15 to 44 during that period. Presumably, an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimate would attribute this exaggerated increase to the recession, 
leading to an overestimate of the effect of unemployment. Despite this, 
Blank notes that her model still does not succeed in explaining the increase 
in caseloads in 1990-94. 
Second, Blank obtains very puzzling results for the effects of specific 
reform features. The coefficient on the "any major state welfare waiver" 
dummy implies that a waiver reduces the participation rate by roughly 
11 percent. However, when this is broken down into a set of dummies for 
different aspects of waivers, the dummy for whether a state imposed time 
24. The sum of the coefficients on the current and two lags of the unemployment rate is 
0.037 (Blank, 2001, table 2). If log(P) = 0.038 U, where P is the participation rate and U the 
unemployment rate, then the elasticity of P with respect to U is 0.038U. The mean unem- 
ployment rate in the data is 6.583 percent, so that at this mean the elasticity is 0.25. 
25. The increase in AFDC caseloads during 1990-94 may have also been related to the 
1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which legalized 2.7 million undocu- 
mented immigrants residing in the United States since 1982, as well as certain seasonal 
agricultural workers, and made these legalized immigrants eligible for welfare after a five- 
year moratorium. Immigrants legalized under IRCA were more likely to be poor than 
immigrants who had entered legally, and legalization may have encouraged resident immi- 
grants to apply for benefits for their children, even if they themselves were barred from aid 
receipt during the moratorium. Since most of these immigrants were legalized in 1987 and 
1988, the five-year moratorium on welfare receipt ended by the beginning of 1994 (see 
MaCurdy, Mancuso, and O'Brien-Strain, 2000, 2002). 
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limits is insignificant (and has the wrong sign), and work requirements are 
insignificant as well. The dummy indicating that a state imposes harsher 
sanctions for failure to satisfy work requirements is estimated to have a 
significant positive effect on caseloads. The variables estimated to signif- 
icantly reduce caseloads are dummies for reduced JOBS exemptions and 
for whether the state imposed a family cap. The latter policy is estimated 
to reduce the caseload by roughly 18 percent, which seems highly 
implausible. As Blank states, "the impact of family caps on the caseload 
in the short run should be minimal. It merely holds benefits constant for 
women who are already on the caseload, it does not remove anyone from 
the rolls."26 
The Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) conducted a similar exer- 
cise using state-level data from 1976 to 1996, updated through 1998 in a 
second paper.27 These papers use much sparser sets of controls than does 
Blank's 1997 paper. The only nonwelfare factors included in the models 
are the current and lagged unemployment rates (along with state and year 
dummies). In the 1997 paper, specifications that include only a portman- 
teau dummy variable for "any statewide welfare waiver" imply that a 
waiver reduces a state's caseload by roughly 5 percent.28 When dummies 
for specific policies are included instead, the estimates are rather impre- 
cise. The only clearly significant policy is stricter work requirement sanc- 
tions, which are predicted to reduce the caseload by roughly 10 percent. 
It should be stressed that a fairly small amount of data underlies these 
estimates. For instance, according to Gil Crouse,29 only five states had 
implemented benefit time limits by early 1996, with two more doing so in 
the second half of 1996. Two states implemented work requirement time 
limits in 1994, four more in 1995, and two more in 1996. Stricter work 
requirement sanctions were more common. Six states implemented these 
before 1995, five more in 1995, and eight more in 1996. Thus it was only 
in 1995-96 that a substantial number of states began to implement TANF- 
like policies.30 
26. Blank (2001). 
27. CEA (1997, 1999). 
28. CEA (1997, table 2, column 3). 
29. Crouse (1999). 
30. Schoeni and Blank (2000) use CPS data from 1977-99, thus including three years 
of post-TANF data. They also disaggregate state-level caseloads by age and educational 
attainment. They measure welfare reform using only waiver and TANF dummies, and they 
attempt to control for all other factors using a large set of state and time fixed effects (we 
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The 1997 CEA report notes that a one-year lead of the waiver dummy 
is significant. The estimates imply that a waiver reduces the caseload by 
roughly 6 percent in the year before it is implemented. The report points 
out that this could be an anticipatory effect: the knowledge that welfare 
policies will become stricter may deter women from welfare participation 
even before the waiver is implemented. But another explanation is based 
on policy endogeneity. It is widely accepted that the increase in welfare 
caseloads in 1990-93, and the increase in program costs that this induced, 
helped create the political momentum that led to implementation of 
waivers and ultimately TANF itself.3' However, by the time many states 
had implemented waiver policies in 1995-96, and certainly by the time 
that most had begun to implement TANF policies in 1997, a rapid decrease 
in the caseload had already begun.32 Any misspecified model that fails to 
capture the sharp decline in welfare caseloads beginning around 1995- 
before the implementation of most TANF-like policies-will tend to attri- 
bute these changes to the TANF and waiver dummy variables. The reason 
is simply that the model will produce large serially correlated residuals in 
the post-1995 period, and any variable that "turns on" in that period will 
help absorb those residuals. Thus what the CEA calls a "policy endo- 
geneity" problem we prefer to call a misspecification or omitted variables 
problem.33 The best way to deal with this problem is to look for additional 
discuss their specification further later in the paper). They obtain the puzzling result that 
TANF had no significant effect on work participation. 
31. For instance, according to the 2000 Green Book (U.S. House of Representatives, 
Committee on Ways and Means, 2000, p. 352), "Frustration with the character, size and cost 
of AFDC rolls contributed to the decision by Congress to 'end welfare as we know it' in 
1996. Enrollment had soared to an all time peak in 1994, covering 5 million families ... ben- 
efit costs peaked in fiscal year 1994 at $22.8 billion," and further, "By early 1995, many Gov- 
emors pressed for a cash welfare block grant to free them from AFDC rules. The concept of a 
fixed block grant. . . was included in reform bills passed by Congress in 1995 and 1996; both 
were vetoed. But a third bill that included changes discussed during the 2 years of debate was 
enacted by Congress in July 1996 and was signed by President Clinton on August 22, 1996. 
By the time of TANF's passage, AFDC enrollment had decreased to 4.4 million families." 
32. This can be seen quite dramatically in the state-by-state graphs of caseloads over 
time presented by Crouse (1999). By our count the graphs provide clear evidence that case- 
loads had begun to fall substantially before any implementation of waivers or TANF in at 
least thirty-three of the fifty states. 
33. Even if policy were endogenous in the sense that increases in AFDC caseloads in 
1990-93 induced the implementation of waivers and TANF policies, this would not by 
itself bias the estimates of policy effects. Only if the residuals are serially correlated would 
one get potential bias in the waiver and TANF coefficients. For instance, suppose that an 
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control variables that can successfully explain caseload evolution in the 
prereform period. This is the approach we take here.34 
It is interesting to note that, in a model with state fixed effects, our ap- 
proach would not work. Consistency of OLS requires only that the covari- 
ates and the errors be contemporaneously uncorrelated (that is, that the 
policy variables be "predetermined"), whereas fixed effects estimators 
rely on "strict exogeneity" (that is, a lack of correlation at all leads and 
lags). Thus policy endogeneity would lead to inconsistent estimates in fixed 
effects models even if the residuals were serially independent. This is a 
strong argument for not including state fixed effects if we believe that 
policy endogeneity is present. 
The CEA models certainly fail to explain both the increase in case- 
loads in 1990-93 and the decline beginning in 1995. Unemployment rate 
changes over this period-the only non-welfare-related explanatory fac- 
tor in the CEA models-seem inadequate to explain the phenomenon, 
given the history of insensitivity of caseloads to unemployment. The 1997 
CEA paper notes that "for the 1989-1993 period that saw a tremendous 
increase in the rate of welfare receipt ... changes in unemployment can 
only explain about 30 percent of the rise . .. that leaves roughly 70 per- 
cent of the rise unexplained by this statistical analysis."35 Their model 
also attributes 34 percent of the decline in caseloads in 1994-96 to "other 
unidentified factors." Thus a key challenge is to develop a model that can 
better account for caseload movements over time, particularly the pre- 
TANF decline in caseloads beginning in 1995. Unless a model can fit this 
pattern, any effects that it attributes to waiver and TANF policies may be 
spurious. 
omitted variable was driving up caseloads in 1990-93 and then started to drive them down 
in 1995. The omission of this variable would generate serially correlated residuals. If one 
could find this variable and include it in the model, thus eliminating the serial correlation, 
the potential bias would vanish. The fact that the welfare policies were driven by caseload 
increases in the early 1990s would be irrelevant. 
34. As CEA (1997) notes, another concern is that caseload increases in the early 1990s 
varied from state to state. If those states that had the largest caseload increases were most 
likely to implement waivers, then the states with the largest residuals in the early 1990s 
would be the ones most likely to implement waivers in 1995 and 1996. If the residuals 
exhibit persistence, then waivers in 1995-96 would be correlated with the 1995-96 residu- 
als as well, inducing bias. Again, this can be thought of as a misspecification or omitted 
variables bias, since, if one could control for the omitted factor driving caseloads-and 
inducing serially correlated residuals-the bias would vanish. 
35. CEA (1997, p. 8). 
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Robert Moffitt argues that the cyclical sensitivity of AFDC caseloads 
might have increased over time.36 Thus, unless one takes a stand on the 
cyclical sensitivity of the caseload and how it has evolved over time, one 
cannot decide how much of the drop in welfare participation after 1994 
was due to welfare reform and how much to the strong economy. If only 
aggregate data were available, these would leave one with a hopeless 
identification problem. However, Moffitt also pointed out that that cross- 
state variation in unemployment rates can, in principle, be used to resolve 
this problem. One could ask whether caseloads fell more or less in states 
where unemployment fell more or less, and one could even identify how 
the cyclical sensitivity of caseloads has varied over time, provided one 
assumes that it varies in the same way in all states. We today are in a 
much stronger position than previous researchers to identify these cyclical 
effects, because we can include data from the recession of 2001-02. 
Studies of Non-TANF-Related Reform Policies 
Other important policy changes that may have influenced the welfare and 
work decisions of single mothers in recent years are the expansions of 
Medicaid eligibility for low-income families not on AFDC and the expan- 
sion of the EITC. As Keane and Moffitt note,37 the fact that single moth- 
ers would tend to lose Medicaid eligibility if they left AFDC created an 
important work disincentive before 1987. But a series of Medicaid eligi- 
bility expansions in 1987-2002 may have reduced this disincentive, by 
allowing single mothers with income above the AFDC/TANF eligibility 
threshold to continue to receive Medicaid benefits. Often eligibility for 
Medicaid expansions depended on the age of a woman' s children. 
Aaron Yelowitz attempted to quantify the effect of Medicaid expan- 
sions on work.38 He measured the extent of eligibility expansion by a sin- 
gle variable, which he called GAIN%, defined as the difference between 
the Medicaid income eligibility threshold under the expansion and the 
AFDC income eligibility threshold before the expansion. Identification of 
Medicaid expansion effects came from the variation in GAIN% across 
states, over time, and across individuals. He used March CPS data from 
1989 through 1992 to estimate a probit model for work participation as a 
36. Moffitt (1999). 
37. Keane and Moffitt (1998). 
38. Yelowitz (1995). 
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function of GAIN%. To control for other factors that might vary across states 
and time, he also included year and state dummies. Yelowitz' s estimates 
imply that the Medicaid expansion of 1989-92 led to a 1.2-percentage- 
point decrease in welfare participation and a 0.9-percentage-point increase 
in labor force participation among single mothers with at least one child 
under 15. However, as discussed earlier, for such a strategy to provide a 
consistent estimate of the effect of the policy variable in question, one has 
to make the strong and likely implausible assumption that all other time- 
varying factors, including all omitted policy variables, impact all single 
mothers in the same way, regardless of the ages of their children or their 
state of residence. Furthermore, we must know a priori whether the omit- 
ted time-varying factors affect the work participation of the "control" and 
"treatment" groups in terms of levels or percentages. Only then will the 
difference-in-differences methodology work. 
Bruce Meyer and Dan Rosenbaum have undertaken a more comprehen- 
sive study of the effects of a wide range of factors on the work decisions of 
single mothers, but their focus is on the EITC.39 They use CPS data for 
1984-96 and incorporate changes in the EITC and other tax rates, AFDC 
and food stamp benefit levels, welfare time limits (under waivers), Medicaid 
expansion, and child care and training expenditures. Meyer and Rosenbaum' s 
paper represented a significant advance over previous studies in that it con- 
trolled for a wide range of factors. Their empirical specification, however, 
did not control for other key TANF-like reforms under waivers, such as 
work requirements. Moreover, because their study used data only up to 1996, 
they do not address the separate contributions of various components of 
the 1996 welfare reform to the subsequent drop in caseloads. Meyer and 
Rosenbaum' s estimates imply that changes in the EITC and other tax poli- 
cies explain more than 60 percent of the increase in work among single 
mothers relative to childless single women in 1984-96. Somewhat unexpect- 
edly, their estimates also imply that Medicaid expansions had a nonnegligi- 
ble and negative effect on work participation. 
We conclude with two general observations about all the studies we 
have described. First, they all use only dummy variables (such as whether 
or not a state has implemented a time limit) to capture policy effects. This 
is a problem because a time limit or other policy change will most likely 
affect rates of entry and exit from welfare, rather than simply inducing an 
39. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001). 
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immediate shift in the level of participation. The effect of such a policy 
thus builds gradually over time. In contrast, we explicitly construct mea- 
sures of the time elapsed since particular policy changes might have begun 
to affect each single mother (based on her state of residence and demo- 
graphics), thus allowing policy effects to develop gradually. 
Second, all the studies we have described include state dummies to 
control for differences in welfare and work participation across states that 
the model leaves unexplained. As already mentioned, one reason for not 
using state fixed effects is that consistency of the fixed effect estimator 
requires the assumption of strict exogeneity, which we believe is invalid 
regarding policy changes. Furthermore, Keane and Kenneth Wolpin show 
how the use of state fixed effects can lead to seriously biased estimates of 
policy effects in a dynamic model.40 For example, in a dynamic frame- 
work, a person decides whether to go on welfare or work or invest in human 
capital today based not just on benefits today but on expected future ben- 
efits as well. Suppose that each state has a typical level of benefit generos- 
ity that is persistent over time (for example, that Minnesota always has 
higher benefits than Alabama), but that benefits in both states fluctuate from 
year to year. These transitory fluctuations in benefits may have little effect 
on work and welfare participation decisions, which instead will be primar- 
ily driven by the permanent component of benefits. Hence a state fixed 
effects estimator may lead one to underestimate the effect of benefit lev- 
els. Using simulations of a dynamic model, Keane and Wolpin show that 
this problem can be severe.4' 
For these reasons we choose not to include state fixed effects in our 
models. Of course, this may create a problem if our control variables fail 
to explain the persistent differences in levels of welfare participation across 
states, and instead generate serially correlated residuals by state. If states 
with persistently negative residuals for welfare participation tended to 
adopt certain policies under TANF, one might falsely infer that these poli- 
cies reduced participation. As we show later in the paper, our models do a 
reasonably good job of explaining the persistent differences in levels of 
welfare and work participation across states, so that we are not too con- 
cerned about this issue. 
40. Keane and Wolpin (2002a, 2002b). 
41. Keane and Wolpin (2002a). 
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To summarize, we feel that previous studies of welfare reform suffer 
from a number of important limitations. Typically, they examine only a 
subset of the many policy and economic environment variables that might 
affect welfare and work decisions. They often use state and time dummies 
to control for omitted time- and state-varying factors. This procedure is 
valid only under the assumption that such omitted factors affect all demo- 
graphic groups equivalently and, even if this is true, that the analyst knows 
whether the equivalence holds in terms of levels or in terms of percent- 
ages. On the other hand, those studies that omit explicit year effects have 
not developed models that succeed in explaining the evolution of welfare 
participation over time at the national level, let alone broken down by state 
and demographic group. 
Data 
The data set used in this paper combines individual-level data from the 
March CPS with data on a rich set of economic and policy variables. In 
describing these data, we will also detail the sources of variation that we 
exploit to identify the effects of key economic and policy variables. 
Individual Data 
Our main data source is the series of March supplements to the Current 
Population Survey fielded between 1981 and 2003, covering activities in 
1980-2002.42 The CPS is designed to provide a nationally representative 
sample by interviewing approximately 60,000 households. The sample 
size was increased in 2001 and 2002 to improve estimates of children's 
health insurance coverage by state, for the purpose of allocating federal 
funds under the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) estab- 
lished in 1997. The CPS asks retrospective questions about demograph- 
ics, work activities, and income. Questions about demographic variables, 
such as age, refer to the week before the interview; those about income 
variables refer to the previous calendar year; and those about work activ- 
ity, such as hours worked and major occupation, refer to both periods. 
42. Our CPS sample is extracted using the CPS Utilities produced by Unicon Research 
Corporation. 
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Our unit of analysis is families headed by single mothers. Since we 
condition on single-motherhood, we take marital status and the presence 
of children as exogenous. Of course, changes in welfare rules could affect 
marriage and fertility, but existing empirical work suggests that these 
effects are small.43 
For purposes of constructing a data set on single mothers, it is impor- 
tant to note that the CPS is organized around households defined by a 
unique address, for example a house or an apartment. A household may 
contain more than one family, with the person who rents or owns the 
house considered the head of the household. We select female-headed 
families or subfamilies as the unit of analysis.44 We then count the number 
of dependents in each female-headed family or subfamily. Note that the 
dependent children are not necessarily the woman's biological children. 
Stepchildren or adopted children, grandchildren, and other unrelated chil- 
dren whom the woman lists as dependents are also counted. 
The CPS survey asks the respondent to provide detailed demographic 
information (including age, race, education, and marital status) for every 
household member. We construct the age composition of the woman's 
children by counting the number of dependent children at each age. This 
is an important step because, as we discuss below, whether a woman is 
subject to particular welfare rules (such as work requirements) or eligible 
for particular benefits (such as child care subsidies) often depends on the 
precise ages of her children. 
We construct our welfare utilization measures from the family' s reported 
sources of income over the previous calendar year, and we analyze work 
participation decisions based on the average hours worked in that year. 
Specifically, we consider a single woman a welfare recipient if her income 
from public assistance (Unicon recode variable incpa) is positive.45 The 
43. See Moffitt (1992). 
44. Specifically, a woman selected into our analysis must satisfy two conditions. First, 
she must be the head of the primary family or a subfamily, which also means that she mnust 
have dependent children. This is ensured by selecting the Unicon recode variable _hhrel to 
equal 1, 3, 5, 8, 10, 13, 15, 18, 20, 23, 26, 30, 32, 35, 38, 41, or 43. Second, her marital sta- 
tus, given by the Unicon recode variable _marstat, must be either 3 (separated), 4 (wid- 
owed), 5 (divorced), or 6 (never married). 
45. The exact wording varies by year, but the essence of the question is, "How much 
did _ receive in public assistance or welfare in the previous year?" and the answer is 
coded as incpa. From 1988 on, the survey also asks about the number of months in which 
public assistance or welfare is received. Note that incpa will capture cash assistance but not 
in-kind assistance, such as food stamps. 
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employment variables come directly from the CPS, which includes the 
"hours worked per week last year" (hrslyr). We recorded a woman as work- 
ing full-time if she works for thirty-two hours or more a week, and part- 
time if she works between eight and thirty-two hours a week. 
Policy Data 
COMPONENTS OF WELFARE REFORM. An important contribution of the 
paper is the comprehensive documentation of the many welfare policy 
changes that occurred at the state level over the 1980-2002 period. We 
collected detailed information about states' policies from many different 
sources.46 The rest of this section describes the different policy compo- 
nents in detail. 
Time Limits. PRWORA prohibits states from using federal TANF 
funds to provide benefits to adults beyond a sixty-month lifetime time 
limit (except that 20 percent of a state's caseload may be exempted). 
Many states have opted for shorter time limits, whereas others have opted 
to use their own funds to provide benefits beyond the federal limit. Some 
states implemented their own time limits under waivers before PRWORA 
was enacted.47 
To understand the set of variables we use to capture the possible effects 
of time limits, it is useful to examine the theory of how time limits can 
affect behavior. A key point is that time limits may have both anticipatory 
and direct effects. The direct effect arises simply from the fact that a per- 
son who reaches the time limit becomes ineligible for further benefits 
(assuming the limit is enforced). The anticipatory effect is subtler. The 
basic idea is that a forward-looking person faced with time-limited 
46. Sources include the State Policy Documentation Project, the U.S. General 
Accounting Office (1997, 1998a), Gallagher and others (1998), Johnson, Llobrera, and 
Zahradnik (2003), Hotz and Scholz (2003), the U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser- 
vices (including its Office of Family Assistance), the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the 
Center for Law and Social Policy, the Urban Institute, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the 
National Governors Association, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, various issues 
of the U.S. House of Representatives' Green Book, the Internal Revenue Service, and vari- 
ous state TANF policy handbooks. 
47. A distinction is sometimes made between when a state implemented its TANF plan 
and when it began counting months toward time limits. Arkansas, California, Ohio, and 
Oregon started counting months toward time limits well after their initial TANF implemen- 
tation dates. We use the actual counting date as the effective date for time limits in our 
analysis. 
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welfare benefits should try to conserve (or "bank") her months of eligibil- 
ity and use them only when truly necessary. 
Consider a simple framework where a woman decides each month 
whether to receive welfare or go to work. A myopic person who maximizes 
current income would choose to participate in welfare so long as it gener- 
ated one dollar more in income than she could earn by working (net of the 
cost of working). But a forward-looking person would choose welfare over 
work only if the gap between benefits and earnings were substantial. Why 
use up a month of welfare eligibility just to get a few extra dollars? In 
some future month she may confront a situation where only very low pay- 
ing jobs are available, so that welfare benefits far exceed her potential 
earnings. It is therefore best to conserve her months of welfare eligibility 
for such circumstances. 
Stated more formally (see appendix A), in a dynamic framework, such a 
woman should make welfare participation decisions by comparing the 
value of current-period welfare benefits with the value of current-period 
potential earnings plus the option value of conserving a month of benefit 
eligibility. As Grogger and Michalopoulos point out, this option value is, 
ceteris paribus, an increasing function of the time horizon over which ben- 
efits may be used (that is, the number of years until the woman' s youngest 
child reaches 18).48 It is also, ceteris paribus, a decreasing function of the 
stock of remaining months of eligibility (that is, the option value of pre- 
serving a month of eligibility is greater when one has only one month left 
than when one has sixty). 
Our empirical models include several variables designed to capture 
both the direct and the anticipatory effects of time limits-both those cre- 
ated under TANF and those created earlier under AFDC waivers. These 
variables and others used in the study are defined in table Cl in appen- 
dix C. Each variable has up to three subscripts: i for individual, s for state, 
and t for year. Thus the subscripts enable one to see whether each variable 
varies across states, across people, or both. 
At the most basic level, we include a dummy variable for whether a 
state imposed a time limit in a given year (DTLSt), as well as a dummy for 
whether the time limit could have been binding for a particular woman 
(DTL_HITiSt), given the ages of her children. A woman whose oldest 
child is x years old cannot have received welfare for more than x years. 
48. Grogger and Michalopoulos (2003). 
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The time limit cannot bind for this woman unless x exceeds the limit, 
regardless of how many years ago her state implemented time limits. Thus 
the year in which time limits may first bind varies across women in the 
same state. 
Note that DTLst captures an anticipatory effect of time limits, and 
DTL_HITiSt a direct effect. We also include variables that allow the antic- 
ipatory and direct effects of time limits on welfare and work decisions to 
develop gradually over time. First, we construct a variable called "months 
elapsed since the implementation of time limits" (MONTH_SINCE_ 
TL_STARTSt). Second, we construct for each single mother a variable 
called "months elapsed since the time limits could first potentially bind" 
(MONTH_SINCE_TL_HITist). 
To evaluate the importance of the anticipatory effect of time limits, we 
construct two more variables motivated by the theory presented in appen- 
dix A. First, the option value of banking welfare eligibility increases with 
the time horizon over which a woman will be categorically eligible for 
benefits. This is the remaining time until her youngest child will reach 
age 18. We call this variable REMAINING_CHILD_ELIGist. Second, the 
option value of banking welfare eligibility decreases with the stock of eli- 
gible months that a woman currently possesses. We call this variable 
REMAINING_TL_ELIGis.t To construct this measure, we first calculate 
the maximum number of months that a woman could have received 
welfare since her state started her "clock." Subtracting this from the state 
time limit tells us the minimum stock of months that the woman 
possesses. 
At this point it is worth commenting on our overall strategy in con- 
structing covariates. We assume that a woman's demographics, the wel- 
fare policy rules she faces, and the economic environment in her state are 
all exogenous. Thus, to maintain a true reduced-form specification, every 
covariate we use as a determinant of welfare or work participation should 
be a function of these demographic, policy, and economic environment 
variables. One can see the effect of this strategy quite clearly by looking 
at how we constructed covariates to measure the effects of time limits. For 
instance, we do not want to use a woman's actual welfare participation 
history to construct the remaining months on her time limit clock, because 
actual participation decisions are endogenous. Similarly, in the construc- 
tion of REMAINING_CHILD_ELIGist, we ignore the fact that a woman 
can always extend her months of categorical eligibility by having another 
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child. REMAINING_CHILD_ELIGist is a function only of a woman's cur- 
rent demographics and state policy variables, and so it is certainly an 
exogenous variable driving current decisions. 
A key point is that Michigan, New York, and Vermont have chosen to 
use state funds to provide benefits to families beyond the sixty-month fed- 
eral limit.49 In other words, these states do not have effective time limits.50 
This is a key source of variation in the data that helps identify the effect of 
time limits on welfare and work participation. To preview our finding that 
time limits have had small effects on welfare participation, we note that in 
Michigan the number of families on welfare dropped by 58 percent from 
August 1996 to June 2002, while the number of individual recipients 
dropped by 62 percent. Over the same period the number of families on 
welfare in New York dropped by 63 percent, while the number of recipi- 
ents dropped 68 percent. These declines are close to the national average, 
suggesting that time limits are not the main factor underlying the dramatic 
drop in welfare participation since 1996. 
Another important source of variation across states is the penalty that 
is imposed when a time limit is reached. Among states with effective time 
limits, six (Arizona, California, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, and Rhode 
Island) continue to provide the child portion of benefits to families even 
after the time limit is reached. As we discuss in appendix A, this substan- 
tially reduces the impact of time limits. Therefore we constructed a mea- 
sure for each state of how benefits are reduced when the time limit is 
reached. 
Work Requirements and Exemptions. Under PRWORA, states must 
require parents who receive TANF assistance to participate in "work 
49. A common mistake in the literature, and in some data sources as well, is to assume 
that New York has a sixty-month life time limit. According to the New York State Comp- 
troller's Office, after the TANF time limit is reached, the state will provide Safety Net 
Assistance (SNA) to the family in the same amount as the family's TANF grant. Twenty 
percent of the monthly payment standard is paid in cash for a personal needs allowance, 
and the rest is given on a noncash basis. Thus New York does not have a true time limit. 
50. As already discussed, Oregon has a formal time limit, but it, too, is irrelevant 
because anyone who satisfies the work requirement for a given month does not have that 
month count toward the time limit, and anyone who does not satisfy the work requirement 
has benefits terminated immediately. Very recently, Arizona and Massachusetts have 
revised their TANF plans to use state funds to provide benefits to families beyond the sixty- 
month federal limit. This change is too recent to be relevant for our empirical work. 
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activities" after a maximum of twenty-four months.5' Many states have 
chosen to adopt shorter work requirement time limit clocks. States adopted 
their first TANF plans over the period from October 1996 through Janu- 
ary 1998 and adopted revised TANF plans roughly two years later. Under 
the initial TANF plans, twenty states required benefit recipients to start 
participating in work activities immediately. Under the revised TANF 
plans, twenty-five states required immediate work participation. Most states 
that do not impose an immediate work requirement have adhered to the 
twenty-four-month maximum allowed under the federal law. The require- 
ment that recipients participate in work activities may increase the disutil- 
ity of welfare participation, leading to reductions in welfare caseloads and 
increased work among single mothers. 
Section 407, paragraph (b)(5), of PRWORA gives states the option to 
exempt single parents with a child up to 1 year of age from work require- 
ments. However, many states, such as California, have chosen to exempt 
only those single mothers with children under 3 or 6 months of age, and a 
few have granted longer exemptions. Thus there is considerable variation 
in the variable we call "age of child exemption from work requirements" 
(CHILD_EXEMPT_AGEst). We use this variable, in conjunction with the 
state-specific work requirement time limit and the age of the woman's 
youngest child, to construct an indicator for whether a woman could be 
subject to a work requirement. We call this variable SWRiSt. 
Thus we have two key sources for the identification of the effects of 
work requirement time limits. First, because of the variation in when 
states implemented their TANF plans and in the length of their work 
requirement time limit clocks, there is substantial variation across states 
in how early a single mother could have been subject to binding work 
requirements. For instance, under AFDC waivers, work requirements 
could have come into force as early as mid-1994 in Iowa, October 1995 in 
Michigan, and mid-1996 in Wisconsin. TANF work requirements could 
have been binding as early as the fall of 1996 in Alabama, Connecticut, 
51. Work activities as defined in PRWORA include "(1) unsubsidized employment; 
(2) subsidized private sector employment; (3) subsidized public sector employment; 
(4) work experience (including work associated with refurbishing of publicly assisted 
housing); (5) on-the-job training; (6) job search and job readiness assistance; (7) commu- 
nity service programs; (8) vocational educational training; . . . and (12) the provision of 
child care services to an individual who is participating in a community service program." 
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Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
and Utah. On the other hand, work requirements were not binding until 
December 1998 in New York, January 1999 in Louisiana, February 1999 
in New Jersey, March 1999 in Pennsylvania, and July 1999 in Illinois, 
Minnesota, and Missouri.52 
Second, as already noted, we can exploit individual variation based on 
children's ages. For example, assume that two otherwise similar women 
living in different states have both been on TANF long enough to have 
reached their state' s work requirement time limit. Suppose that each has a 
youngest child who is 9 months old. Suppose further that their states have 
similar policies, except that one state exempts women with children under 
12 months old and the other exempts only women with children under 
6 months old. Then only the woman in the first state is exempt from the 
work requirement, and any difference in welfare participation and work 
behavior between these women will provide additional evidence on the 
effects of work requirements. Similarly, take two otherwise similar women 
living in different states, each of whom has just one child, who is 18 months 
old. Suppose their states have similar policies, except that one imposes an 
immediate work requirement whereas the other imposes a work require- 
ment only after twenty-four months on welfare. The woman in the first 
state may be subject to a work requirement, but the woman in the second 
cannot be. Since her only child is only 18 months old, she cannot yet have 
been on welfare for twenty-four months.53 
Besides the exemption based on age of youngest child, many states allow 
other exemptions from work requirements under TANF. These include 
exemptions for single parents with children under age 6 who are unable to 
obtain child care, and for recipients who are disabled or have a disabled 
household member.54 We call the total number of these exemptions 
52. We calculate that the fraction of women who were potentially subject to a work 
requirement (SWR = 1) was 5 percent in 1995 and then rose to 16 percent in 1996, 46 per- 
cent in 1997, 62 percent in 1998, 85 percent in 1999, and 91 percent in 2000. It then stabi- 
lized at about 91 percent in 2001-02. 
53. It is important o understand how the exemption for age of youngest child interacts 
with the work requirement time limit clock. Suppose that a state has a twenty-four-month 
time limit and that mothers whose youngest child is less than 12 months are exempt. If a 
woman is on welfare starting from the time the child is born, then when the child reaches I 
year of age she will have just 1 year left on the clock. 
54. States must maintain certain work participation rates among TANF recipients in 
order to avoid penalties to their TANF block grants. Originally, 25 percent of all families 
receiving assistance were required to participate in work activities for at least twenty hours 
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N_WR_EXEMPTIONSt. States also differ as to whether they impose a 
full or a partial benefit sanction if a recipient does not satisfy the work 
requirement. A "partial" sanction generally means that only the adult por- 
tion of benefits, and not the children's portion, is denied. In 1996 nine 
states imposed a full sanction. That number increased to twenty-three in 
1997 and stayed close to thirty from 1998 onward. We call the dummy 
variable indicating imposition of a full sanction DFULLSANCTIONSt. 1 
We view both the sanction variable and the exemption variable as indica- 
tors of the strictness with which a state enforces its work requirement time 
limit, and we interact the work requirement variables with these measures 
of strictness.56 
Finally, work requirements can, in theory, have anticipatory effects 
just as time limits do. If a state adopts a work requirement with a twenty- 
four-month time limit before the requirement is triggered, this creates an 
incentive to avoid welfare participation even before the twenty-four 
months are used up. One reason is to conserve time on the clock. Another 
reason is that, since the time limit reduces expected future welfare partic- 
ipation, it increases the value of human capital investment today. Thus we 
also include in our models a dummy for whether a state has a time limit in 
effect (DWORKREQst). 
Benefit Reduction Rates and Earnings Disregards. The AFDC 
program always imposed a "tax" on a recipient's earnings while on wel- 
fare, called the benefit reduction rate (BRR). Allowance was made for 
deductions for work and child care expenses, and over the history of the 
AFDC program the amounts of these work expense deductions were 
changed several times, as was the BRR itself. Notably, the BRR was 
decreased from 100 percent to 67 percent in 1967, but it was raised back 
a week. The required rate was gradually raised to 50 percent in 2002, and the hours require- 
ment was raised to twenty-five hours in 1999 and thirty hours in 2000. However, these 
requirements were relaxed for states that achieved substantial caseload reductions. Because 
caseloads fell so dramatically after 1996, states were rarely subject to significant participa- 
tion rate requirements. 
55. States often have a more lenient sanction policy for first-time violators of work 
requirements. Although we have information about these first-time sanction rules, we use 
only the "ultimate" sanction rule in our analysis. There is a high correlation between the 
first-time and ultimate sanctions. 
56. Pavetti and Bloom (2001) classify twenty-five states as "strict" and thirteen as 
"lenient" in terms of the benefits denied to families of noncompliant individuals. Their 
classification is roughly consistent with our direct classification of states with full versus 
partial sanctions. 
34 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2004 
to 100 percent in 1982. Starting that year the work expense deduction 
was set at $90 a month, and an additional child care expense deduction 
was introduced. 
In addition, in an effort to encourage work among participants, the 
AFDC program at various times in its history included "earnings dis- 
regards." That is, for a specified time after an AFDC recipient started a 
job, a part of her earnings (above and beyond the work and child care 
expense deductions) would not be subject to the BRR. In general, this 
earnings disregard consisted of a fixed component (for example, the first 
$30 of monthly earnings) and a variable component (for example, one- 
third of earnings beyond the first $30) and applied only during the first 
several months of work.57 Starting in late 1992, again in an effort to 
encourage work, many states used waivers to enhance their earnings dis- 
regards. PRWORA did not mandate specific disregard policies, and, as a 
result, substantial heterogeneity has emerged in how states set disregards. 
Many states have expanded disregards and allowed them to apply indefi- 
nitely. For instance, under its TANF plan implemented in January 1998, 
California set the fixed portion of the monthly disregard at $225 and the 
variable portion at 50 percent, with no phase-out over time. Since the 
variable part of the disregard is not phased out, it acts just like a BRR of 
50 percent, and this is in fact how we code it. Across states, as of 2002, 
fixed disregard amounts varied from zero to $252, and variable disregards 
ranged from zero to 100 percent. 
Obviously, earnings disregards, the BRR, and work expense deduc- 
tions directly affect a woman' s incentive to work by altering her effective 
after-tax wage rate. A lower effective tax rate makes welfare receipt more 
attractive. Furthermore, as we discuss in appendix A, effective tax rates 
also affect the incentive to bank months of eligibility when time limits are 
present. The higher the effective tax rate, the greater the incentive to forgo 
participating in welfare in a month when work can be found. 
Diversion Programs. Under TANF many states have developed 
"diversion" programs under which new TANF applicants can receive a 
57. After 1982 the rule was as follows: For each of the first four months of work, the 
first $30 of earned income, plus one-third of the remainder, was disregarded when calculat- 
ing the monthly benefit. After four months and until one year, only the $30 monthly disre- 
gard continued. After one year there was no earnings disregard. This means that, after one 
year, a recipient's grant amount was reduced by one dollar for every dollar she earned 
above the $90 work expense deduction. 
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few months' worth of benefits up front if they agree not to participate in 
TANF for some stated period of time. A typical program may offer three 
months of benefits up front to a person who agrees to stay off "welfare" 
for three months. We view this as largely an accounting device to make 
TANF caseloads appear smaller, and so we code such diversion payment 
recipients as welfare recipients. Eight states, however, have introduced 
what we regard as genuine diversion programs, whereby TANF appli- 
cants agree to stay off welfare for an extended period in return for short- 
term cash payments (or loans) whose value is well below the maximum 
value of the forgone benefits.58 In the empirical analysis we simply intro- 
duce a dummy variable to indicate whether the woman lives in a state 
with a genuine diversion program. 
Child Support Enforcement and Treatment of Child Support Income. 
Although nonpayment is widespread, child support is an important source 
of income for single women with dependent children (see table 4 below). 
Under AFDC, recipients were required to assign child support collections 
to the welfare agency. States were then required to pass through the first 
$50 of monthly child support payments to the family. This pass-through 
income was disregarded for purposes of benefit calculation. Between Jan- 
uary 1993 and August 1996, states requested and received waivers of a 
number of AFDC provisions related to child support enforcement. These 
waivers sometimes involved changing the pass-through amount or allow- 
ing single mothers to keep child support payments, in which case they 
would be subject to certain disregards just like earned income. Under 
TANF, all states have discretion to set their own policy in terms of pass- 
through or disregard of child support payments. 
The Child Support Enforcement and Paternity Establishment (CSE) 
program was enacted in 1975 to address the problem of nonpayment of 
child support owed by noncustodial parents. CSE has programs to help 
locate absent parents and establish paternity. The CSE administrative 
expenditure is an important indication of how likely it is that a single 
woman will be able to collect child support. Figure 4 showed the large 
increase in CSE expenditure, from $2.92 billion in 1996 to $5.14 billion 
in 2002, a 76 percent jump. To measure state-level CSE activity, we take 
state-level CSE expenditure and divide it by the state population of single 
58. These eight states are Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Idaho, Montana, Texas, Wash- 
ington, and Wisconsin. 
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mothers (excluding widows).59 This, combined with variation in CSE 
spending across states and over time, provides the three key sources of 
variation that identify the effect of child support enforcement expenditure 
on welfare and work participation. 
In terms of the incentives created, there are important interactions 
between CSE expenditure and the pass-through and disregard rules. Since 
child support payments are heavily taxed under TANF rules in many 
states, enhanced child support collections make welfare less appealing. 
On the other hand, enhanced pass-throughs or disregards may reduce this 
incentive. 
Child Care Subsidies and the Child Care and Development Fund. In 
the late 1980s several new programs expanded federal support for child 
care. The Family Support Act of 1988 created two programs, AFDC 
Child Care and Transitional Child Care. AFDC Child Care was designed 
as an entitlement for single parents on AFDC who were working or 
enrolled in job training or education programs. Transitional Child Care 
provided a temporary child care subsidy to single parents with young chil- 
dren for twelve months after they left AFDC to start working. Both pro- 
grams used AFDC participation as an eligibility criterion. The Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA 1990) created the Child Care 
and Development Block Grant and the At-Risk Child Care program. 
These programs gave states funds with which to subsidize child care for 
low-income working families who were not on AFDC. However, unlike 
AFDC Child Care and Transitional Child Care, these benefits were not an 
entitlement. PRWORA consolidated these four preexisting programs into 
the Child Care and Development Fund. The CCDF provides federal funds 
to the states to use in providing child care subsidies to low-income work- 
ing families, whether or not these families are current or former TANF 
recipients. Under the CCDF a great deal of heterogeneity has emerged in 
the design of states' child care subsidy programs. In particular, many 
states ration benefits, and states differ in terms of whether they give prior- 
ity to low-income families who are on TANF or to those just transitioning 
off TANF. 
We use state CCDF expenditure per single mother as a measure of the 
availability and generosity of child care subsidies in a state. A key factor 
59. CSE expenditure should not impact the work or welfare decisions of widows, who 
do not have ex-husbands from whom to collect alimony or child support. 
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identifying the effect of these subsidies is that they are essentially irrele- 
vant for women whose children are older than 12, since they are not eligi- 
ble for subsidies except in rare instances (for example, for children with 
special needs). Also, the effect of child care subsidies is presumably 
stronger for women whose children are not yet of school age. 
As we discuss in appendix B, an important aspect of PRWORA is the 
maintenance-of-effort requirement, which requires each state to maintain 
spending on assistance for needy families at a minimum of 75 percent of 
its pre- 1996 level in order to receive the full TANF block grant. The MOE 
requirement interacts with the CCDF in an important way. The CCDF 
funding system is rather complex, consisting of federal funds to which 
states are entitled, plus federal matching funds that require state contribu- 
tions, plus discretionary state contributions, including a certain level of 
funds that states are allowed to transfer out of the TANF block grant. But 
the key point is that the state part of CCDF spending counts as MOE 
spending. Thus, when welfare caseloads began to drop unexpectedly rapidly 
after 1996, causing state spending on TANF cash assistance to drop, the 
states shifted substantial resources into the CCDF as one way to achieve 
the MOE requirement. This dynamic was partly responsible for the rapid 
growth in total expenditure on CCDF from 1996 to 2002 (figure 4). 
An alternative to using CCDF expenditure per single mother as a mea- 
sure of the generosity of a state's child care program would be to use 
detailed program parameters, such as the monthly income limit for eligi- 
bility and the co-payment rate, which are state-specific and have varied 
over time within states. We choose not to use this approach because of the 
problems created by rationing. A state with a seemingly generous program 
(for example, a high income eligibility threshold and a low co-payment) 
will tend to have a longer waiting list. Thus program generosity is more 
accurately measured by the state' s actual expenditure per case than by the 
income eligibility threshold and co-payment rates. 
CONTEMPORANEOUS POLICY CHANGES. Our data set also contains de- 
tailed information about state policies other than those directly related to 
AFDC and TANF. 
Earned Income Tax Credit. The EITC, enacted in 1975, is a refund- 
able federal income tax credit that supplements wages for low-income 
working families. Major expansions of the EITC occurred in 1986, 1991, 
and 1994-96. Because of these expansions, the number of families receiv- 
ing EITC increased from 6.2 million in 1975 to 19.5 million in 2000, and 
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total EITC payments increased from $1.25 billion to more than $31 bil- 
lion (figure 3).6 
The EITC rules specify four parameters: a phase-in rate, a phase-out 
rate, a phase-in income range, and a phase-out income range. These 
parameters depend on family size. After the expansions of the mid- 1990s, 
the EITC became a sizable wage subsidy to low- and moderate-income 
families. Thus it may provide an important work incentive. For example, 
in 2003 the phase-in and phase-out rates for a family with one child were 
34 percent and 15.98 percent, respectively. The phase-in annual income 
range is from zero to $7,490, and the phase-out range is from $13,730 to 
$29,666. Thus a single mother with one child with taxable income 
between $7,490 and $13,730 would receive an EITC of $2,547. The EITC 
phase-in rate is even higher (40 percent in 2003) for families with two or 
more children. 
As of 2003, seventeen states had enacted their own EITCs that supple- 
ment the federal credit. Most of these were enacted in the 1990s. Our 
econometric analysis combines the federal and state EITC programs and 
characterizes them by two parameters: the phase-in rate and the maximum 
credit amount.6' Many sources of variation help identify the effects of 
the combined EITC. One source is variation across time. For example, the 
federal EITC phase-in rate for families with one child increased from 
10 percent in 1980-84 to 14 percent in 1987-90, 16.7 percent in 1991, 
17.6 percent in 1992, 18.5 percent in 1993, 26.3 percent in 1994, and 
34 percent in 1995, where it has remained since. Second, since 1991 a dif- 
ferent EITC phase-in rate and maximum credit have applied to families 
with one child than to families with two or more children, thus introduc- 
ing variation across individuals. Third, the implementation of state EITC 
programs at different times and with different parameters has introduced 
variation across states. 
Food Stamps. The food stamp program provides coupons that can be 
exchanged for food at participating stores. The value of the coupons to 
which a family is entitled depends on a grant level, which depends on 
family size, and a benefit reduction rate, which is applied to income. 
Unlike AFDC/TANF benefits, food stamp benefit levels are set at the fed- 
eral level, and the same rules apply in all states except Alaska and Hawaii. 
60. See also U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means (2000, p. 813). 
61. We collect state EITC information from Johnson, Llobrera, and Zahradnik (2003), 
Hotz and Scholz (2003), and state government websites. 
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We collect the food stamp program parameters directly from the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. Currently, the food stamp benefit reduction 
rate is 30 percent. 
Medicaid and SCHIP. AFDC/TANF participants have had health 
insurance coverage provided by Medicaid since the inception of the Med- 
icaid program in 1965. Since 1987 a number of expansions of Medicaid 
eligibility have enabled single mothers, under various circumstances, to 
leave AFDC/TANF while maintaining Medicaid coverage. Between 1987 
and 1990 several legislative options and mandates were enacted to expand 
Medicaid eligibility for pregnant women, infants, and children. OBRA 
1989 required states to cover all pregnant women, as well as all children 
below age 6, living in families with income at or below 133 percent of 
the federal poverty line. OBRA 1990 required states to phase in coverage 
of children born after September 30, 1983, and living in families with 
income below the poverty line, until all children through age 18 were cov- 
ered. As of October 1, 1997, children 14 years of age and younger were 
covered in all states, and the upper age limit of 18 was reached in all states 
in October 2002. 
The States Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), established 
under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, appropriated roughly $24 billion 
in federal grants over five years for states to use to provide health insur- 
ance to uninsured children under age 19 in families with incomes below 
200 percent of the federal poverty line. SCHIP covers approximately 
5.3 million children nationwide. States are using this new grant money to 
expand Medicaid, to develop new programs or expand existing programs 
that provide health insurance, or both. 
We collected Medicaid rules for each state since 1987 (and SCHIP 
rules since 1997) from the annual Maternal and Child Health updates of 
the National Governors Association.62 These updates provide detailed 
information on the age limits of children covered by Medicaid (indepen- 
dent of welfare status) and the age-specific income eligibility thresholds 
(as a percentage of the poverty line). We combine these rules with the 
ages of the children of each single mother to obtain the variable 
MEDICID_PCTist, which measures the percentage of children who 
would be covered by Medicaid if their mother left welfare but earned less 
than the income threshold for Medicaid eligibility, which is coded by the 
62. The updates from 1990 to 2002 can be found at www.nga.org. 
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variable MEDICAID_FPList. Since the income threshold varies by age of 
the child, we used the threshold applicable to the woman's youngest eli- 
gible child as a percentage of the federal poverty line in constructing 
MEDICID_FPList. 
MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES. We include several variables in our 
model to control for state and national economic conditions. We obtain 
state unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. From the 
Urban Institute-Brookings Tax Policy Center we obtain information on 
personal and standard income tax deductions (deflated by the consumer 
price index) and the federal income tax rate for the lowest bracket. Data 
on minimum wage rates are collected from the Department of Labor web- 
site. Finally, we construct the 20th percentile wage rate for each state 
(deflated by the consumer price index) from CPS data. 
Descriptive Statistics on Single Mothers 
Our data set contains 127,119 observations on single mothers 18 years 
and older over 1980-2002. Here we provide descriptive statistics about 
the single-mother population and their welfare and work participation 
over that period. 
Demographics 
Table 2 summarizes basic demographic information about single 
mothers. The racial composition of single mothers has been very stable 
over time, with about 62 to 65 percent white and 32 to 35 percent black. 
On the other hand, there has been a dramatic and steady increase in the 
proportion of never-married single mothers, from 15.6 percent in 1980 
to 41.3 percent in 2002. In fact, in 1997 "never married" overtook 
"divorced" as the most common marital status among single mothers. The 
fact that the proportion of never-married single mothers continued to 
increase after 1996 is interesting, as an explicit objective of PRWORA 
was to lower the incidence of out-of-wedlock births. 
Table 2 also shows a slow downward trend in the average size of fam- 
ilies headed by single mothers. The proportion of single mothers with 
only one child increased from 48.3 percent in 1980 to 54.5 percent in 
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from 7.7 percent in 1980 to 4.7 percent in 2002 (not shown). On average, 
single mothers have about 1.7 to 1.8 children. 
Finally, table 2 summarizes single mothers' educational attainment. 
The share of single mothers who are high school dropouts declined from 
34.5 percent in 1980 to 19.3 percent in 2002. At the same time, the share 
with at least some college increased from 26.5 percent to 45.3 percent. 
However, the bulk of this rather substantial increase in educational attain- 
ment occurred before 1996. 
An important message of table 2 is that shifts in the demographics of 
single mothers since 1996 have been rather gradual. The largest shift over 
this period was the increase in never-married single mothers, and this shift 
is not favorable regarding work. Thus demographic shifts alone will be 
unable to account for much of the drop in welfare caseloads since 1996. 
Welfare Participation Rates 
The solid lines in figure 5 show welfare and work participation rates 
for single mothers from 1980 to 2002.63 In contrast to the trend in the 
total AFDC/TANF caseload (figure 1), the welfare participation rate 
was much more stable before 1994, hovering around 30 percent, with a 
peak of 32.2 percent in 1993. Since 1993, however, welfare participation 
has dropped spectacularly, all the way to 9.0 percent in 2002, or by 
72 percent.64 
Figure 6 reports welfare participation rates for eight large states. Clearly, 
both levels and trends in participation rates differ substantially from state to 
state. The participation rate peaked in California in 1993, and in Texas 
and Florida in 1992; all these observations are roughly consistent with the 
national trend. But in Michigan the participation rate has trended down 
since 1983, and in Illinois it has trended down since 1987. The peak year 
in Pennsylvania was 1984, but a second run-up followed, which peaked in 
1992. Peak years in New York and North Carolina were 1990 and 1991, 
respectively-a bit earlier than the national peak. 
63. Recall that we define "welfare participation" as receipt of cash public assistance. 
64. Since the March CPS consists of repeated cross-sectional data (with only a small 
panel component), we cannot determine the extent to which the decrease in welfare partic- 
ipation is due to an increase in exit from or a decrease in entry into welfare. Grogger, 
Haider, and Klerman (2003) used data from the Census Bureau's Survey of Income and 
Program Participation to examine the importance of entry in explaining the drop in welfare 
caseloads. 
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Figure 5. Actual and Predicted Welfare and Work Participation Rates among 
Single Mothers, 1980-2002 
Percent 
80 
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Sources: CPS data and authors' calculations. 
The left-hand panels of figures 7 though 11 show how the welfare par- 
ticipation rates of single mothers vary with their demographic characteris- 
tics. Of course, such differences are not surprising. What is more 
interesting is that the trends in participation rates also differ in important 
ways across demographic groups. For instance, the left-hand panels of 
figure 7 show that welfare participation rates differ substantially by edu- 
cational attainment, as one would expect. In 1994 the participation rate 
was 47.7 percent among single mothers who were high school dropouts, 
26.9 percent among those who were high school graduates without a col- 
lege degree, and 5.8 percent among those with at least a college degree.65 
More interesting, however, is the fact that, as a percentage, participation 
has dropped less (62 percent) for the least educated group; the participa- 
65. The second group combines those single mothers who had only a college degree 
with those who had some college (and possibly an associate degree) but not a bachelor's. 
The participation rate among single mothers with a bachelor's degree and no further educa- 
tion was 7.1 percent. 
Figure 6. Actual and Predicted Welfare Participation Rates among Single Mothers, 
Selected States, 1980-2002 
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Sources: CPS data and authors' calculations. 
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Figure 7. Welfare and Work Participation Rates among Single Mothers by 
Educational Attainment, 1980-2002 
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Sources: CPS data and authors' calculations. 
a. Combined data for "High school diploma only" and "Some college." 
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tion rate declines since 1994 for the other two groups were 71 and 80 per- 
cent, respectively. 
The left-hand panels of figure 8 show that the welfare participation 
rates of single mothers also differ substantially by marital status. The 
participation rate of the never-married mothers has historically been the 
highest (44.1 percent in 1994), followed in that same year by separated 
(33.7 percent), divorced (18.8 percent), and widowed mothers (12.3 per- 
cent). Interestingly, the percentage drops since 1994 for these four groups 
also differed, at 71, 67, 74, and 52 percent, respectively. Because of the 
relatively large drop in their participation rate, divorced single mothers 
are now the least likely to be on welfare. 
As the left-hand panels of figure 9 show, welfare participation rates 
have historically been much higher for black than for white single moth- 
ers. However, the participation rate for whites was fairly stable at roughly 
25 percent from 1980 to 1994, while the rate for blacks fell from 42.6 per- 
cent to 37.0 percent. Thus in 1994 the participation rate for blacks was 
47 percent higher than that for whites. Since the welfare reform of 1996, 
racial differences in participation rates have narrowed further: in 2002 the 
rates were 8 and 10.5 percent for whites and blacks, respectively, so that 
the rate for blacks was only 31 percent higher. Thus the decline in welfare 
participation rates has been much greater for blacks than for whites and 
started much earlier. 
The left-hand panels of figure 10 show that participation rates are much 
higher for single mothers with younger children, as already discussed. 
Interestingly, the drop in participation from 1994 to 2002 is larger for 
mothers whose youngest child is 6 to 12 years old (70 percent) than for 
those whose youngest child is less than 6 years old (68 percent) or those 
whose youngest child is 13 to 17 years old (63 percent). The same pattern 
is found for specific ages at the low end of these ranges: 76, 62, and 
47 percent for mothers whose youngest child is 6, 1, and 13 years old, 
respectively; not shown. Thus the notion of a pure anticipatory time limit 
effect implies a monotonically decreasing rate of decline as the age of the 
youngest child increases, ceteris paribus. These figures seem somewhat 
inconsistent with that story. 
Finally, the left-hand panels of figure 11 show that single mothers 
with more than one child are more likely to be on welfare than are single 
mothers with only one child. However, the percentage drop in welfare 
participation from 1994 to 2002 was similar for single women with one, 
Figure 8. Welfare and Work Participation Rates among Single Mothers by 
Marital Status, 1980-2002 
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Figure 9. Welfare and Work Participation Rates among Single Mothers by Race, 
1980-2002 
Welfare participation Work participation 
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Source: CPS data and authors' calculations. 
two, three, or four or more children (69, 71, 65, and 66 percent, respec- 
tively; not shown). 
Work Participation Rates 
In summarizing trends in work participation rates for single mothers from 
1980 to 2002, we combine part-time work (defined above as from eight to 
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Figure 10. Welfare and Work Participation Rates among Single Mothers by 
Age of Youngest Child, 1980-2002 
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Figure 11. Welfare and Work Participation Rates among Single Mothers by 
Number of Children, 1980-2002 
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thirty-two hours a week) and full-time work (more than thirty-two hours a 
week) into a single "working" category. The general patterns we describe 
here are robust to plausible changes in these definitions. 
Figure 5 shows that the share of single mothers who work increased 
from 67.8 percent in 1993 to 82.0 percent in 2000. With the onset of the 
recession, the working share slipped back, to 79.1 percent in 2002. It is 
interesting that the upward trend in work participation began a year earlier 
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than the dramatic drop in welfare participation. Welfare participation rose 
rather noticeably in 1993, whereas work participation also increased that 
year, but only slightly. It is plausible that this occurred because the expan- 
sion of the EITC provided a substantial enhancement of work incentives in 
1993, whereas regulations that made AFDC less attractive, such as work 
requirements under waivers, were not widely introduced until 1994. Both 
the share of single mothers not working and the share on welfare start to 
trend down strongly together in 1994. Not shown in figure 5 but also 
notable is that almost all the increase in work activity took the form of 
increased full-time work. The share of single mothers working full time 
increased from 53.3 percent in 1993 to 67.3 percent in 2000, while the 
share working part time stayed fairly flat (in the 14 to 15 percent range). 
Figure 12 reports work participation rates for eight large states. 
Clearly, both levels and trends in work differ substantially by state. In 
California work participation is rather stable except for a dramatic 
increase in 1996-2000. In contrast, in Michigan participation trends up 
over the whole 1980-2002 period. Florida and Pennsylvania show clear 
cyclical patterns, but the participation rate is rather flat in Texas and 
North Carolina throughout our sample period. New York shows a slight 
upward trend in the mid-i 990s followed by a sharp increase in 
1998-2000. Illinois has an upward trend from 1980 through 1999, fol- 
lowed by a decline. 
The right-hand panels of figures 7 through 11 show how the work partic- 
ipation rates of single mothers vary with their demographic characteristics. 
The right-hand panels of figure 7 show, not surprisingly, that work is much 
more prevalent among the more educated. Since 1993, however, the share 
of single mothers not working has declined at all education levels. For 
single mothers with less than high school, those who had completed high 
school but not college, and those who had at least completed college, the 
declines in the share not working were 28, 33, and 13 percent, respec- 
tively. (The declines were 31 percent for those with a high school diploma 
only, 35 percent for those with some college, and 29 percent for those 
who had a bachelor's degree but no further college; not shown.)66 
66. We prefer to report percentage declines in the share not working, rather than per- 
centage increases in the share working, because the former can always range from zero to 
100 percent regardless of the baseline. Thus the percentage decrease in the share not 
working should be more comparable across groups with different baseline rates of work 
participation. 
Figure 12. Actual and Predicted Work Participation Rates among Single Mothers, 
Selected States, 1980-2002 
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Sources: CPS data and authors' calculations. 
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For certain other demographic characteristics, however, the trends in 
work participation differ across groups in important ways. For instance, 
the right-hand panels of figure 8 show the work participation rates of sin- 
gle mothers of different marital status. Divorced single mothers are the 
most likely to work, and widowed single mothers the least. In 1993 the 
shares of widowed, never-married, separated, and divorced single mothers 
at work were 49.5, 58.9, 65.8, and 80.0 percent, respectively. In 2002 these 
percentages had risen to 56.2, 75.9, 78.2, and 86.8 percent, respectively. 
Thus the decrease in the not-working share is greater for never-married 
single mothers (41 percent) than for the other groups. It is interesting that 
the never-married group and the separated group show slight upward trends 
in work participation in the pre-1993 period, whereas the divorced and 
widowed groups do not. 
As the right-hand panels of figure 9 show, work participation rates for 
white single mothers have historically been higher than those for black 
single mothers. The work participation rate for whites held stable at 
roughly 72 percent from 1980 to 1994, while that for blacks rose from 
57.5 percent to 64.3 percent; these patterns roughly mirror those of the 
welfare participation rates for both races. Since the welfare reform of 
1996, racial differences in work participation have narrowed further. In 
2002 the work participation rates for whites and blacks were 81 percent 
and 76 percent, respectively, a difference of only 5 percentage points (or 
6.6 percent). 
The right-hand panels of figure 10 summarize the work participation 
rates of single mothers according to the age of their youngest child. In 
1993 only 59.6 percent of single mothers with children ages 0 to 5 worked. 
By 2000 this rate had increased to 79.6 percent, but with the recession it 
dropped back down, to 76.6 percent in 2002. In contrast, 74.2 percent of 
single mothers with children ages 6 to 12 were at work in 1993, as were 
a slightly larger fraction of those with older children. The overall de- 
crease in the not-working share from 1993 to 2002 was 42 percent for 
single mothers with children ages 0 to 5, 28 percent for those with chil- 
dren 6 to 12, and 14 percent for those with children 13 to 17. Comparable 
figures for women with children of specific ages are 41 percent for those 
with infant children, 35 percent for those with 6-year-old children, and 
36 percent for those with 13-year-old children (not shown). Meanwhile 
the working share of women with 17-year-old children stayed fairly flat at 
about 75 percent. 
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The right-hand panels of figure 11 show that work participation rates 
tend to be lower for single women with more than one child. What is more 
interesting is that the increase in work from 1993 to 2002 was much 
greater for women with two or more children than for those with only one 
child. The not-working share of mothers with one child declined from 
25.8 percent in 1993 to 20.0 percent in 2002-only a 22 percent decrease. 
But among those with two children (not shown), the share not working 
fell from 32.0 percent to 18.7 percent, a 42 percent drop. For women with 
more children the percentage decreases were slightly larger (not shown). 
One plausible explanation for this pattern would attribute it to the EITC, 
since the EITC phase-in rate for women with one child increased by only 
5.8 percentage points from 1993 to 2002, while that for women with two 
or more children increased by 13 percentage points. Of course, it is also 
possible that child care or Medicaid expansions, or both, were more impor- 
tant for women with more children, or that work requirements had a 
greater effect on women with more children. 
In general, the key fact that these discussions bring home is that there 
are important differences across states and demographic groups in how 
work and welfare participation have changed over time. A successful model 
should therefore explain changes in work and welfare participation among 
single mothers not just at the national level, but also at the state level and 
at the level of particular demographic groups. We will allow for interactions 
of our policy measures with the key demographic measures discussed here 
(education, marital status, race, age, age of children, and number of chil- 
dren) in order to accommodate the fact that different policies may affect 
different groups differently. 
Differences in Welfare and Work Participation Rate Changes 
As noted above, the welfare participation rate among single mothers 
overall dropped from 32.2 percent in 1993 to 9.0 percent in 2002, a 
23.2-percentage-point decrease. At the same time, the work participation 
rate increased from 67.8 percent to 79.1 percent, an 11.3-percentage-point 
increase. The gap between the drop in welfare and the increase in work is 
thus a full 11.9 percentage points. What explains this discrepancy? 
One factor is that that work and welfare are not mutually exclusive. If 
a single mother who is working while on welfare then leaves welfare but 
continues to work, overall welfare participation falls but work participa- 
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Table 3. Accounting for the Discrepancy between Falling Welfare Participation and 
Rising Work Participation among Single Mothers, 1993-2002 
Percent of all single mothers except where stated otherwise 
1993 2002 
Not on Not on 
welfare On welfare Total welfare On welfare Total 
Not working 11.35 20.86 32.21 16.43 4.51 20.94 
Working 56.49 11.30 67.79 74.54 4.52 79.06 
Total 67.84 32.16 100.00 90.97 9.03 100.00 
Fall in welfare participation rate = 32.16 - 9.03 = 23.13 percentage points 
Rise in work participation rate = 79.06 - 67.79 = 11.27 
Difference = 11.86 
Fall in share working, on welfare = 11.30 - 4.52 = 6.78 percentage points 
Rise in share not working, not on welfare = 16.43 - 11.35 = 5.08 
Sum = 11.86 
Source: Authors' calculations using data from the March CPS. 
tion does not increase. By the same token, women may leave welfare 
without finding work. Table 3 decomposes the discrepancy between the 
changes in the overall welfare and work participation rates. It shows that 
the fraction of single mothers who both work and receive welfare dropped 
from 11.3 percent in 1993 to 4.5 percent in 2002, a decrease of 6.8 per- 
centage points. Meanwhile the fraction of single mothers who neither 
worked nor collected welfare increased from 1 1.4 percent to 16.4 percent, 
an increase of 5.1 percentage points. (The small difference is due to round- 
ing.) Together these components exactly account for the gap between the 
increase in work and the decrease in welfare participation. The fact that the 
share of single mothers who neither work nor receive welfare increased by 
5 percentage points is troublesome, because this may be a vulnerable 
group.67 We return to this issue later in the paper. 
Income and Other Quality-of-Life Measures 
Table 4 summarizes trends in the incomes of single mothers over 
1980-2002. Table 5 does the same for several other life quality measures, 
namely, housing arrangements, number of hours worked per week, and 
average hourly wages. 
67. Moffitt (1983) proposed and estimated a model of welfare stigma to explain why a 
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Table 4 reports single mothers' average real incomes (in 2001 constant 
dollars) and the main sources of that income. From 1980 through 1993 the 
mean real income of single mothers was basically flat, except for a brief 
decline in 1981-83. However, from 1993 to 2002 their mean real income 
increased from $18,498 to $23,068, or by 25 percent. Their mean real 
wage earnings increased by $5,161, or 39.5 percent, over the same period. 
Much less important sources of income that showed some gain in this 
period were child support and alimony, perhaps reflecting the increases in 
state expenditure on child support enforcement. At the same time, mean 
income from public assistance and food stamps dropped substantially, 
from $2,450 in 1993 to $800 in 2002. 
The source of the real wage earnings increase can be decomposed 
into the fraction due to the increased work participation rate, that due to 
increases in average hours worked per week (conditional on employment), 
and that due to increases in real hourly wages. Recall that the work partic- 
ipation rate of single mothers increased from 67.8 percent in 1993 to 
79.1 percent in 2002, a 16.7 percent increase. According to table 5, the 
mean hourly wage rate increased from $11.16 to $12.88 over that period, 
a 15.4 percent increase.68 Average hours worked per week increased from 
37.6 to 38.3, a 1.7 percent increase. Thus the hourly wage increase together 
with the increased work participation rate explains almost all of the 
39.5 percent increase in real wage earnings experienced by single mothers 
in this period. The last column in table 4 shows the average (simulated) 
value of federal and state EITC payments. (The CPS imputes these EITC 
payments rather than querying for them directly, and so we do not include 
them in the total real income measures.) Note that from 1993 to 2002 the 
average real EITC more than doubled. 
Table 5 also shows that the share of single mothers living in public 
housing declined from 11.4 percent in 1993 to 9.4 percent in 2002. Some- 
what surprisingly, the rate of cohabitation increased only slightly over the 
same period, from 30.5 percent to 31.9 percent.69 We have already seen 
that the share of single mothers who do not work and are not on welfare 
increased by 5 percentage points over that period. In future work we plan 
68. To obtain an hourly wage measure for each woman, we divide total wage income 
(Unicon recode variable incwage) by total hours worked, which is the product of hours 
worked per week last year (hrslyr) and total weeks worked last year (wkslyr). 
69. We say a single mother cohabits if she lives in a house or apartment where another 
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to investigate more carefully the income sources of these women. Prelim- 
inary results suggest that they are more likely to reside in public housing 
and to cohabit, and that they tend to receive above-average benefits from 
Social Security and Supplemental Security Income, but that their incomes 
are still well below the average for single mothers. 
The Empirical Specification 
Demographics and Identification 
Table C1 in appendix C describes the variables used in our empirical 
analysis. Our dependent variable is either welfare recipiency status 
(WEL_RECEIPTist) or work participation (WORKist), both of which are 
categorical, zero-or-one variables. The individual-level demographic 
variables included in the model are age, which is continuous, and several 
categorical variables: race (three categories), educational attainment (four 
categories), marital status (four categories), state of residence (fifty-one 
categories), and urban or rural residence (two categories). We also cate- 
gorize family composition by five variables: numbers of children in age 
groups 0-5, 6-12, and 13 and above, and the ages of the youngest and the 
oldest child. 
A completely saturated model would include a separate dummy vari- 
able for each demographic group in each state in each time period. But 
because six of the demographic variables are continuous, the number of 
demographic "groups" would be enormous. For the purpose of under- 
standing identification, it is useful to think of a simpler situation in which 
the data on age and number of children are discretized. Suppose that all 
we observed in the data was that the woman is in one of four age intervals, 
that her youngest child is in one of three age intervals, that her oldest child 
is likewise in one of three age intervals, and that she has either one child, 
two children, or three children or more. We would then have 4 x 3 x 3 x 3 
= 108 categories of family age composition. In addition, we have 3 x 4 
x 4 x 2 = 96 types of mothers in terms of race, education, marital status, 
and urban or rural residence, giving 108 x 96 = 10,368 demographic cells. 
A fully saturated model that interacted demographics x states x time would 
then include 10,368 x 51 x 23 = 12,161,664 parameters and would fit the 
data on welfare and work participation (by cell) perfectly. 
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Of course, a fully saturated model does not permit the identification of 
policy effects. Since the model fits the data perfectly using demographic 
x state x time dummies, it is impossible to identify the effect of any 
particular time-varying factor, such as a policy variable.70 If we wish to 
identify a policy effect, we must exclude certain interactions. The 
source of identification depends on which interactions are allowed and 
which are excluded. 
As already discussed in our review of the literature, much of the previ- 
ous literature in this area has relied on specifications that include state 
dummies, year dummies, and state-specific quadratic time trends. This 
gives a model with 51 + 23 + 100 = 174 parameters. A typical procedure 
is then to include a measure of a single policy, such as a time-varying 
dummy variable for whether a state has yet imposed time limits. 
It is important to understand the assumptions that underlie identifi- 
cation in such a specification. One is assuming that any omitted time- 
varying factors, including policy variables other than the one being 
investigated, either have common effects across all states (picked up by 
the year dummies), or, if they do have differential effects by state, that 
these are captured by the smoothly varying state-specific quadratic time 
trends. Both these assumptions would be violated by an omitted policy 
variable that "turned on" discretely in a particular year (say, 1993) and 
that had differential effects across states (say, because it affects different 
demographic groups differently and the demographic composition of states 
differs).7' 
To avoid these problems, one could use a more flexible specification 
that included state x year interactions (that is, state-specific time dummies 
rather than state-specific time trends). Such a specification would have 
51 x 23 = 1,173 parameters, plus the additional parameters characterizing 
the single policy under study. In that case identification of the policy 
effects would rely on how the policy affects different demographic groups 
within a state differently over time. The key assumption is that any omitted 
70. Note that the lack of identification has nothing to do with the fact that the number 
of parameters in a saturated model would exceed the number of available data points 
(127,119 in our case). This is a finite-sample problem, whereas identification analysis pro- 
ceeds under the hypothesis that one has unlimited data. Rather, the lack of identification 
comes from the fact that, if the model is saturated, then all time-varying factors are con- 
trolled for. 
71. They would also be violated by state-specific policy variables that turn on dis- 
cretely at particular points in time (so long as timing differs across states or, if timing is 
synchronized, effects differ across states). 
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policy variables have common effects across all demographic groups. We 
have already argued at length that this assumption is implausible. 
One could try to deal with this problem by including demographics 
x time interactions. Given that we have 10,368 demographic cells, this 
would generate 10,368 x 23 = 238,464 parameters, although one could 
perhaps reduce this by defining groups much more coarsely. Even here, 
however, one is continuing to assume that any omitted policies that affect 
different demographic groups differently are national policies and, as such, 
cannot be implemented at different times in different states. This is obvi- 
ously false in the case of welfare reform. But relaxing this assumption 
brings one back to the saturated specification.72 
Given that, over the 1980-2002 period, states pursued an array of dif- 
ferent policies that clearly have different effects on different demographic 
groups, and given that these policies were implemented at different times 
in different states, we feel it is not possible, under reasonable identifying 
assumptions, to identify the effect of any single policy (or small set of 
policies) while using an array of state and time dummies to control for all 
other aspects of policy. Therefore we take a very different course. We 
have attempted, as best we can, to include in our model measures of the 
entire range of policy changes that occurred at the state level over the 
whole 1980-2002 period. We also interact these policy variables with a 
range of demographic controls to allow for the fact that policies affect dif- 
ferent groups differently. 
72. Schoeni and Blank (2000) adopt a hybrid approach by including some demographics 
x time interactions and state-specific time trends. Rather than use individual data, they use 
March CPS data from 1977 through 1999 to calculate welfare participation rates by state and 
by year for each of three education and four age categories, giving 23 x 3 x 4 x 51 = 14,076 
cells to be fit. Their model includes 234 parameters, since it includes 50 state dummies, 
9 demographic dummies (age, education, and race), 50 state-specific time trends, 23 aggre- 
gate time dummies, 69 aggregate time dummies interacted with education, and a total of 
27 interactions of the three education group dummies with current and lagged unemploy- 
ment and employment growth rates, the AFDC grant for a family of three, and four age dum- 
mies. They then include just six parameters to capture the effects of welfare reform. These 
are dummies for whether a state had a waiver or had implemented TANF, both of which are 
interacted with the three education categories. This model is identified because it assumes 
that any omitted policies that affect different education groups differently are purely national 
rather than state-specific, and because it rules out omitted variables that affect different age 
groups differently. We view such assumptions as untenable, given the great heterogeneity of 
policies across states, and because many policies might affect women of different ages dif- 
ferently. For example, older mothers are likely to have higher wages and therefore may be 
more affected by the EITC; they will also tend to have older children and therefore are likely 
to be less affected by the CCDF, time limits, and work requirements. 
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Thus, in estimating the effect of any particular policy, we are in effect 
controlling for other time-varying factors not through dummies, but rather 
by including those other policy and economic environment factors explic- 
itly in the model, and by including policy x demographics interactions 
that allow those other factors to affect different groups differently. The 
key identifying assumption is that we have adequately controlled for all 
the important time-varying factors that influenced the welfare and work 
participation decisions of single mothers over the 1980-2002 period. Of 
course, this is a very strong assumption, but it should at least in principle 
be achievable (if not by us, then at least by others who can improve on our 
specification). In contrast, the approach of using portmanteau dummies to 
control for all other aspects of policy seems to rely necessarily on assump- 
tions that are clearly untenable. 
Our model that includes demographics, policy variables, and economic 
environment variables, along with a rich set of interactions among these 
groups of variables, contains a total of 245 parameters. This is remarkably 
parsimonious relative to the portmanteau dummy variable specifications 
described above. It is also a small parameter set relative to our sample size 
(N = 127,1 19).73 Despite this parsimony, as we shall demonstrate, our 
model does quite a good job of explaining differences in welfare partici- 
pation and work both across states and demographic groups and over time 
within states and demographic groups. 
Policy and Economic Environment Variables 
The third panel of table Cl lists our individual-level policy measures. 
These are constructed from the individual-level demographic variables 
in conjunction with relevant policy variables. For example, the variable 
WELFARE_BENist (the AFDC/TANF benefit level for each individual 
single mother) is constructed using the state payment standard for the 
corresponding family size of the single mother. Similarly, the variable 
EITC_RATEist, which denotes the EITC phase-in rate, is constructed by 
combining information on federal and state EITC phase-in rates with 
73. Schoeni and Blank (2000) provide an interesting point of comparison, as theirs is 
fairly typical of work that uses a small set of variables to measure policy and attempts to 
control for omitted policy variables using state and time dummies. Their model has 
234 parameters, and, since they fit it to 14,076 state x year x age x education cells, they 
have a smaller ratio of data points to parameters than we do (60:1 versus 519:1). 
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information on family size. In general, since we have individual-level 
data, we have exploited every opportunity to tailor policy variables to the 
individuals based on their demographics, which we again assume are 
exogenous. 
Another example is the variable MONTH_SINCE_WR_HITiSt, which 
measures the cumulative time (in months) elapsed since the woman may 
potentially have been subject to work requirements. In actual implemen- 
tations of work requirement time limits, a woman who fails to satisfy 
work activity requirements is not typically denied benefits as soon as the 
time limit is reached. Rather, she becomes subject to a series of sanctions 
and remedial measures, which may eventually result in benefit termina- 
tion if she fails to make a "good faith" effort to comply. Thus we hypoth- 
esize that the effect of a binding time limit on behavior is likely to be 
increasing in the time that has elapsed since the time limit was reached. 
Construction of individual-level work requirement measures is rather 
involved. Recall that states often exempt a woman with children below 
some threshold age (typically around 12 months) from work require- 
ments. Thus we must examine the ages of all the woman's children and 
ask for each child whether that child would have exempted her from the 
work requirement when he or she was born, and, if so, for how long. (This 
is complicated because, over the years, many states have changed the 
exemption for very young children.) We then add up all the possible child 
age exemptions from work requirements and use this information to cal- 
culate how long the woman may potentially have been subject to work 
requirements.74 In contrast to this duration measure, the variable SWRist 
("subject to work requirement," as defined previously) is simply a mea- 
sure of the fraction of the year t that a woman may be subject to work 
requirements. This depends on whether her state of residence has a work 
requirement, on whether she has potentially reached her work require- 
ment time limit, and on the fraction of the year that she may be exempted 
from work requirements if she has a young child. 
The fourth panel of table Cl lists our state-level policy and economic 
variables. These vary both across states and across time but do not vary 
74. In constructing this variable we do not measure whether a woman is actually sub- 
ject to a work requirement, or for how long a woman has actually been up against a binding 
time limit. The reason we use "potential" rather than "actual" measures is that the actual 
measures would be endogenous (dependent on the woman's work or welfare participation 
decisions) and therefore do not belong in a reduced-form equation. 
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across individuals in the same state and year. For instance, this set includes 
the length of the state's time limit, TL_LENGTHst; the time elapsed since 
the state's time limit clock started (under either waivers or TANF), 
MONTH_SINCE_TL-STARTst; and whether the child's portion of TANF 
benefits continues after the exhaustion of the time limit, DCHILDBENst. 
The last panel of table Cl lists our federal-level policy variables. These 
variables, which vary only across time, are the federal minimum wage (in 
2001 constant dollars an hour), MIN WAGEt, and the lowest-bracket fed- 
eral income tax rate, INCTAX_RATEt. 
The Empirical Specification 
In our regression models, the dependent variable, either WEL_RECEIPTist 
or WORKist is regressed on the full set of individual-level demographic 
variables, individual-level policy variables, and state and federal policy 
variables listed in table Cl. We also include a wide range of terms that 
interact the policy variables with the demographic characteristics of respon- 
dents (table C2 in appendix C). 
The main rationale that led to most of the interaction terms in our 
model is the notion that welfare policy variables should have different 
effects on women with different labor market opportunities (that is, dif- 
ferent offer wage rates), different nonlabor incomes (for example, differ- 
ing access to alimony or child support), and different fixed costs of 
working (for example, depending on whether they have young children). 
These three characteristics are, in turn, determined by the woman's age, 
race, education, marital status, and children's ages. Thus our basic strat- 
egy was to interact this set of demographic variables with each major pol- 
icy variable. 
From the descriptive statistics cited earlier, we know that welfare and 
work participation, and how they have changed over time, differ substan- 
tially across these demographic groups. Thus we expect that these inter- 
action terms will be crucial in fitting the data. There could also be important 
interactions between policy variables. For example, single mothers may 
be more or less responsive to work requirements if the EITC is more gen- 
erous. Our model thus includes a number of policy interactions as well. 
We stress, however, that our specification was not chosen as the result 
of a specification search. That is, we neither added variables in an attempt 
to fit the data better nor deleted variables that proved insignificant. Instead 
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we specified our list of demographic, policy, and economic environment 
measures, as well as the list of interaction terms, a priori. 
Empirical Results 
Evaluating the Fit of the Model 
Before we can take seriously the implications of our model regarding 
the impact of welfare policy on behavior, it is important to verify that the 
model provides a good fit to the data. Figure 5 above shows that the model 
accurately tracks both the welfare and work participation rates of single 
mothers at the national level over the 1980-2002 period and the changes 
in those rates. This accomplishment may seem trivial, but, as noted in our 
review of the literature, previous models that omitted time dummies have 
failed to achieve this result. Because we have no time dummies, our 
model explains changes in welfare participation over time based on 
changes in demographics, policy, and the economic environment alone. 
On the other hand, the earlier models that included time effects attrib- 
uted much of the change in welfare participation to the time effects, which 
is in effect an admission of ignorance. As figure 5 shows, inclusion of a 
fifth-order time polynomial in our model leads to essentially no improve- 
ment in fit,75 and to almost no change in the model's predictions regarding 
various policy changes. In other words, the model assigns no significant 
role to unmeasured time-varying factors at the national level. 
Figure 6 shows the model's fit to welfare participation rates in eight 
large states. It is not surprising that our model does not fit the changes in 
welfare participation over time as well at the state level as at the national 
level, since at the state x year level the sample sizes are much smaller, 
generating much more noise. Nevertheless, our model replicates quite 
well both the differences in levels across states and the changes in partic- 
ipation rates within states over time. 
For example, in the early 1980s welfare participation in Texas was 
around 20 percent, while that in Michigan was around 45 percent. Our 
model is able to generate these cross-state differences quite accurately 
using demographic and policy differences alone, without state dummies. 
75. Our model produces an R2 of 0.2403 for welfare participation and 0.2064 for work 
participation. Adding a fifth-order polynomial in time increases the R2 by 0.0003 for both 
specifications, which is trivial. 
66 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2004 
The main failure of the model is that it consistently overestimates welfare 
participation in California by about 5 percentage points in the 1980-93 
period. But, on the whole, the fit at the state level seems quite good.76 
Most strikingly, the model correctly predicts the downward trend in wel- 
fare participation in Illinois, Michigan, and Pennsylvania that began back 
in the mid-1980s, well before the national downtrend began. 
Figure 12 shows the model's fit to work participation rates in the same 
eight large states. Here the fit is excellent. For instance, the model cor- 
rectly predicts the steady upward trend in work participation in Michigan 
over the whole 1983-2000 period. It also correctly predicts that work par- 
ticipation was flat in California from 1980 to 1995, jumped up rapidly in 
1996-98, and then flattened again. And it predicts the several turning 
points in work in Florida and Pennsylvania quite well. Bear in mind that 
this is all done without using any state or national time effects. 
Figures 7 through 11 show how the model fits the behavior of various 
demographic groups. All the figures convey the message that our model 
fits the differences in levels across demographic groups, as well as changes 
over time within groups, very well. All these group differences are ex- 
plained without the use of any group-specific time effects. 
Our model fits equally well when we further narrow down the demo- 
graphic groups to, for example, combinations of race and marital status, 
and when we apply the model to other states, as well as to various demo- 
graphic groups within states (results not shown). That the model fits quite 
well in all these dimensions is comforting, as it suggests that we have suc- 
cessfully included most of the key time-varying factors driving behavior 
over this period. 
One might argue that it is not surprising that the model fits the data so 
well given that we have 245 terms in our regression. However, we see 
such criticism as misguided, for two reasons. First, as we have pointed 
out, an alternative empirical model that included state x year interactions 
would have 1,173 parameters plus any policy variables. Such a model 
would not be able to explain differences across demographic groups unless 
it also included demographics x policy interactions, leading to a vastly 
expanded version of the model. On the other hand, inclusion of demo- 
graphics x year interactions would lead to many thousands of additional 
76. Adding state dummies increases the R2 to 0.2489 for welfare participation and to 
0.2095 for work participation. These changes are significant but seem quantitatively small. 
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parameters. Thus the model is actually quite parsimonious compared with 
such alternatives. 
Second, we require that our model fit not only the national work and 
welfare participation trends, but also the variation in participation rates 
over time by state and demographic group. This is a very stringent test. 
For example, although, as noted above, a simple fifth-order polynomial in 
time fits national rates quite well, it completely fails to capture how 
changes in welfare and work participation rates have differed across states 
and demographic groups. A model with state x year effects would fit 
changes over time by state while failing to fit changes over time by demo- 
graphic group, yet it would have many more parameters than our model. 
Thus one can easily envisage specifications with many more parameters 
than ours that would nevertheless fail to fit well in all the dimensions we 
examine. 
Interpreting the Estimates 
In models with many interaction terms, individual coefficient estimates 
become difficult to interpret. Thus, instead of presenting our parameter 
estimates, we try to give an intuition of what the estimates mean by pre- 
senting predicted probabilities of welfare participation for a set of single 
mothers with different demographic characteristics under a variety of pol- 
icy regimes. We focus on the model's implications regarding the different 
impacts of work requirements, time limits, and the unemployment rate. 
Table 6 reports the probability of welfare participation as predicted by 
the model for sixteen different types of single mothers under two policy 
regimes: one without any work requirement or time limit, the other with 
both a work requirement and a time limit. To obtain our sixteen represen- 
tative types, we vary the mother's race, education, marital status, and age 
of youngest child while holding other characteristics fixed. For each 
dimension we consider only two settings: black versus white, high school 
dropout versus college graduate, never married versus divorced, and 
youngest child age 2 versus youngest child age 13. Regarding the other 
characteristics, it is assumed that each woman has two children, with the 
older child age 15; that the woman herself is age 35; that they live in a 
state where monthly welfare benefits are $500, and so forth. We also vary 
the economic environment by setting the unemployment rate at either 
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Table 6 shows that our model yields plausible response patterns. In all 
cases the more educated women have much lower predicted rates of wel- 
fare participation. The drop in welfare participation (in percentage points) 
in response to the imposition of time limits and work requirements is much 
greater for high school dropouts than for college graduates (who should be 
relatively insensitive to welfare policy). Typically, blacks respond more 
to work requirements and time limits than do whites. And women with 
younger children respond more than women with older children. The model 
also predicts that welfare participation rates are higher, and the welfare- 
reducing effects of work requirements and time limits slightly greater, 
when unemployment is higher. 
Explaining the Drop in Welfare Participation and 
the Increase in Work 
Here we present the central element of our analysis, which uses the model 
to decompose the contributions of various welfare reform components 
and of other economic as well as policy variables to both the drop in the 
welfare participation rate and the increase in the work participation rate 
from 1993 to 2002. Our approach is as follows. We conduct six counter- 
factual experiments, which are detailed below. In each experiment we use 
the model to simulate what welfare and work participation would have 
been from 1994 through 2002 under the hypothesis that a specific eco- 
nomic or policy variable of interest stayed fixed at its 1993 level, while all 
other policy and economic variables followed their actual post-1993 
paths. The difference between the predicted welfare (or work) participa- 
tion rate under the experiment and that observed when the variable in 
question is allowed to take its actual historical path is then said to be the 
contribution of that variable to the change in welfare (or work) participa- 
tion from 1994 through 2002. The six experiments are as follows: 
-No time limit. We assume that no states implement time limits. The 
counterfactual data are generated by setting DTLst (and thus all terms 
interacting with DTLst) to zero for all years from 1993 onward. 
-No work requirement. We assume that no states implement 
work requirements. The counterfactual data are generated by setting 
DWORKREQst (and its interaction terms) to zero from 1993 onward. 
-No EITC expansion. We assume that the federal and state EITC 
phase-in rates of 1993 are maintained through 2002, and that the real 
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value of the maximum EITC credit stays fixed at the 1993 level. Recall 
that EITC_RATEist and EITC_MAXist are both individual-level policy 
variables. Thus we hold the way they vary with family size fixed as per 
the 1993 rules as well. 
-No unemployment rate change. We assume that state unemployment 
rates do not change from 1993 onward. 
-No CCDF expenditure. We assume that states do not have child care 
subsidy programs. The counterfactual data are generated by setting 
CHILDCAREst (and its interaction terms) to zero. 
-No Medicaid expansion. We assume that Medicaid does not expand 
from 1993 onward. We construct counterfactual values of MEDICAID_ 
PCTist and MEDICAID_FPList for all individuals observed after t > 1993 
using the Medicaid rules used in state s in 1993. 
DECOMPOSING THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WELFARE PARTICIPATION 
RATE DROP. Table 7 summarizes our results on the effects of various wel- 
fare reform policies on welfare participation, by year from 1997 through 
2002. The first data column reports the percentage-point change in wel- 
fare participation from 1993 until that year, as predicted by our model. 
The remaining columns of the table correspond to various policy changes. 
In each case we report how many percentage points less the welfare par- 
ticipation rate would have dropped if that policy change had not been 
implemented. 
For example, in the row for 2002 in the top panel of table 7, the first 
data column indicates that our model predicts a welfare participation rate 
drop of 23.8 percentage points from 1993 to 2002. The next two columns 
indicate that, had time limits not been implemented in any state, the drop 
in welfare participation would have been 2.5 percentage points less, 
which is equal to 10.6 percent of the overall 23.8-percentage-point drop in 
participation. Thus our model implies that time limits were a relatively 
small factor in generating the overall caseload decline. 
In contrast, the next two columns of table 7 show that, according to our 
model, the drop in the welfare participation rate from 1993 to 2002 would 
have been 13.6 percentage points less if no states had implemented work 
requirements, and thus that work requirements accounted for 57 percent 
of the decline in welfare participation among single mothers from 1993 
to 2002. 
According to our model, the second-largest factor driving down wel- 
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of table 7. Our estimates imply that this factor accounted for 6.2 percent- 
age points of the drop in welfare participation from 1993 through 2002, or 
26 percent. 
The next two columns of table 7 report the effect of the unemployment 
rate. Interestingly, according to the model, from 1993 through 1997 the 
unemployment rate accounts for a 2.4-percentage-point drop in the wel- 
fare participation rate, which was 21 percent of the overall decline up 
until that time. However, in the recession of 2001-02, the impact of 
unemployment is lessened, because the unemployment rate in 2002 was 
no longer so much lower than it had been in 1993. Thus, for the whole 
1993-2002 period, our model says that macroeconomic conditions 
account for only 1.6 percentage points, or 7 percent, of the total decline in 
the welfare participation rate. 
Aside from work requirements, the EITC, time limits, and the macro- 
economy, no other variables seemed to have a major effect on the evo- 
lution of welfare caseloads.77 Table 7 also reports results for CCDF 
expansion and Medicaid expansion, both of which had very small pre- 
dicted effects. In fact, these effects are of the "wrong" sign relative to our 
expectations, but they are so close to zero that we doubt they are signifi- 
cant. These findings could have several explanations. For example, many 
states give preference to TANF recipients or to women transitioning off 
77. Note that total shares do not necessarily sum to less than one. The reason is that, in 
the actual model, we included interaction terms among various combinations of the policy 
variables. Our method of decomposition, however, assumes that in each counterfactual 
only one variable deviates from the actual. Previous research, such as CEA (1997, 1999), 
suggested that the strictness of sanctions for failure to satisfy work requirements is a key 
factor. A related variable is the ease with which one can obtain exemptions from work 
requirements. Our variables capturing these aspects of policy are whether a state has a full 
or partial (ultimate) benefit sanction for failure to satisfy work requirements, and the num- 
ber of work requirement exemptions allowed (maximum = 3). To examine the importance 
of these variables, we conducted two counterfactual experiments. In the first, all economic 
and policy variables were kept at their actual values, except that all states are assumed to be 
"lenient" (with only partial sanctions and three exemptions). In the other, all states are 
assumed to be "strict" (with full sanctions and no exemptions). Our model predicts that 
welfare participation would have been 1.5 percentage points higher in 2002 under the 
lenient regime than under the strict regime, and that work participation would have been 
0.5 percentage point higher under the strict regime. Thus the strictness of work require- 
ments does have a noticeable effect (about half as large as the effect of time limits), but it is 
far less important than work requirements per se. 
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TANF in the allocation of limited CCDF funds. This could actually create 
an incentive for TANF participation.78 
The bottom two panels of table 7 examine the determinants of the fall 
in the welfare participation rate separately by race. According to our 
model, macroeconomic conditions played a larger role in the decline for 
black single mothers than for whites. This is consistent with the notion 
that employment opportunities are more sensitive to macroeconomic con- 
ditions for blacks than for whites. In fact, our results in table 9 below con- 
firm this. (Table 9 is similar to table 7, except that it examines the increase 
in work participation rates, rather than the decrease in welfare participa- 
tion rates.) According to table 9, changes in the macroeconomy led to a 
4.4-percentage-point increase in the work participation rate for black sin- 
gle mothers over the 1993-2002 period, but only a 1.9-percentage-point 
increase in the work participation rate for whites. Our model also implies 
that work requirements are relatively more important in explaining the 
rise in the work participation rate for whites than for blacks, whereas time 
limits played a relatively larger role for blacks. 
Table 8 examines the determinants of the drop in welfare participation 
from 1993 to 2002 separately by demographic group. The first panel 
breaks down the effects of different policies by age of the single mother's 
youngest child. Regardless of the youngest child's age, the importance of 
time limits is small compared with that of work requirements and the 
EITC. There is evidence that time limits are more important for single 
mothers with younger children.79 However, consistent with our earlier 
discussion, the difference is much less apparent if one looks at percentage 
changes, since single mothers with younger children start from a much 
higher base participation rate. 
The second panel in table 8 shows that time limits were a much more 
important factor for single mothers who are high school dropouts than for 
those with a high school but not a college diploma. This is true both in 
percentage-point terms (7 percentage points versus 2) and in percentage 
terms (19 percent of the drop in welfare participation versus 9 percent). 
This is what we would expect in a dynamic model, since mothers who are 
78. See U.S. General Accounting Office (1998b). 
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high school dropouts have higher rates of unemployment and therefore a 
greater incentive to bank eligibility under time limits. 
The third and fourth panels of table 8 show that time limits are rela- 
tively important for never-married single mothers and for single mothers 
with two or more children. This is again consistent with these groups hav- 
ing relatively high baseline unemployment rates, implying that they have 
a greater incentive to conserve their eligibility. 
DECOMPOSING THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WORK PARTICIPATION RATE 
INCREASE. Table 9 summarizes our results on the effects of various wel- 
fare reform policies on work participation. According to the top panel, out 
of the overall 10.8-percentage-point predicted increase in work from 1993 
to 2002,80 the model implies that 3.6 percentage points (33 percent) was 
due to the EITC expansion, 2.7 percentage points (25 percent) to macro- 
economic conditions, 1.8 percentage points (17 percent) to work require- 
ments, and 1.1 percentage points (10 percent) to time limits. 
Thus the ranking of the policy variables in terms of their impact on 
work participation is drastically different from that for welfare participa- 
tion. Macroeconomic conditions, as captured by local unemployment rates, 
were until 2001 the most important contributor to the increase in work 
participation. For the 1993-2000 period, the macroeconomy accounts for 
more than 40 percent of the total increase in work participation. But its 
contribution has recently dropped, reflecting the recession that began in 
March 2001. By 2002 the EITC had become the most important factor.81 
The top panel of table 10 examines the determinants of the increase in 
work in 1993-2002 separately by age of the youngest child. A key result 
80. Recall that the work participation rate of single mothers actually increased by 11.3 
percentage points from 1993 to 2002 in the data. 
81. According to the top panel of table 7, our model implies that the EITC generated 
6.21 percentage points of the drop in welfare participation from 1993 to 2002. Thus it may 
seem puzzling that, according to table 9, the EITC accounts for only a 3.6-percentage-point 
increase in the work participation rate. Presumably, the EITC gets women off welfare by 
getting them to work, and therefore one might expect that these effects should be roughly 
equal. The discrepancy arises because, as discussed earlier, work and welfare are not mutu- 
ally exclusive. Expansion of the EITC encourages some single mothers on welfare who 
were working to leave welfare and continue to work. This reduces welfare participation 
while not increasing work participation. Thus the number of single mothers who leave wel- 
fare because of EITC expansion should be larger than the number who start working 
because of the expansion, and this is consistent with what we find. Recall that, in general, 
the total decrease in welfare participation (23 percentage points) was more than twice as 
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is that the macroeconomy has been much less important relative to other 
factors for mothers with young children (those age 5 and under). For this 
group our model says that EITC expansion and work requirements were 
the largest factors increasing work over the 1993-2002 period, account- 
ing for 44 percent of the increase. This is not surprising, because mothers 
with young children are traditionally much less likely to participate in 
the labor market, and therefore they should be less sensitive to macro- 
economic conditions. 
The fact that single mothers with young children have, more than other 
groups, been forced into employment by work requirements does raise 
concerns about the impact of a mother' s work on her young children. This 
is an important topic for future research. 
The second panel of table 10 contains some interesting results on how 
various policies have different effects on single mothers who are high 
school dropouts than on those with a high school education or more. It is 
striking that work requirements account for 42 percent of the 17-percentage- 
point increase in work participation among high school dropouts, but a 
negligible part of the 7-percentage-point increase in work participation 
among the more educated single mothers. The increase in work for the 
more educated group is driven almost entirely by the EITC (55 percent) 
and by the macroeconomy (40 percent). Yet these results are exactly what 
one would expect. The more educated women have higher offer wage rates 
and are therefore more likely to have been close to the margin where they 
would be better off working than on welfare. A stronger macroeconomy 
(and, for some at least, the EITC wage subsidy) could easily push them 
over that margin. On the other hand, the high school dropouts have poorer 
labor market opportunities, so that a work requirement may be necessary 
to push them off welfare and into market work. The third and fourth 
panels of the table show the decomposition by marital status and number 
of children. 
This also suggests that the impact of welfare reform on "welfare" in the 
economic sense for these two groups of women may be radically different. 
Women who choose to work because an improved economy and enhanced 
EITC have driven up their effective wage rates must be better off. Women 
who entered the labor market because of a binding constraint induced by 
work requirements must be worse off. This is an important topic for future 
research. 
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To sum up: our simulations seem to have a great deal of face validity. 
When we predict that different policies have had different effects on dif- 
ferent groups, the differences are in line with what one would expect in 
light of economic theory. 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS. Given that our model contains 245 variables, to 
allay concerns that our results might be sensitive to possible collinearity 
problems, we also estimated a "sparse" specification that eliminated 
eighty-eight of the interaction terms (those indicated in brackets in 
table C2). We dropped these terms because we judged, a priori, that they 
represented interaction effects that would be relatively weak or subtle.82 
This simpler model fit nearly as well as the full model, and it produced 
very similar predictions. We take this as evidence that collinearity is not 
a concern. 
Some critics have suggested that the model succeeds in explaining 
the recent dramatic drop in caseloads because it includes the variable 
MONTH_SINCE_WR_STARTst, which plays a role similar to a linear 
time trend that starts around 1996-97 in most states. These critics argue 
that even if we had randomly assigned the state-specific policy variables to 
the individual women, regardless of their true state of residence, the model 
would still fit the data well. To address this concern, we constructed an 
artificial data set in which welfare policy variables were indeed ran- 
domly assigned to each woman. Specifically, we assigned to each woman 
in the CPS data, with equal probability, the set of policy variables appro- 
priate for one of the fifty states or the District of Columbia. 
The resulting model fit the aggregate patterns of welfare and work par- 
ticipation and the patterns by demographic group rather well. But it fit the 
state data quite poorly. Not surprisingly, it largely missed the important 
cross-state differences in both levels of and changes in welfare and work 
participation that we discussed in detail above. In particular, it com- 
pletely misses the fact that welfare participation peaked much earlier than 
1993-94 in many states. This model also produced some very odd predic- 
tions of policy effects. For example, it implied that work requirements 
accounted for almost the entire drop in welfare participation, that the 
82. More specifically, the basic rationale was as follows: In our model each of several 
policy areas, such as time limits and work requirements, is characterized by several vari- 
ables. In the full model the demographics are interacted with each of the variables within 
each policy area. In the sparse model we interact the demographics with only the one or two 
variables within each policy area that we judged a priori to be the most important. 
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macroeconomy played a negligible role in the 1993-99 period (and, in 
fact, that it slightly reduced employment), and that time limits slightly 
increased welfare participation (while nevertheless accounting for a large 
part of the increase in work). We take these very odd results as confirma- 
tion that it is important to carefully code policy variables at the state and 
the individual level in order to avoid collinearity and provide plausible 
estimates of policy effects. 
Conclusion 
It has been a decade since states began implementing welfare reform 
under AFDC waivers, and seven years since the overhaul of the U.S. wel- 
fare system under PRWORA. Judging from the more than 60 percent 
drop in welfare caseloads and welfare participation rates, and the close to 
20 percent increase in work participation rates among single mothers, 
these policies would seem to have been a major success. However, this 
success was achieved during one of the greatest economic expansions 
since World War II and amid a wide range of other economic and policy 
changes, most notably a dramatic expansion in the EITC, Medicaid, and 
CCDF expenditure. To make better policy in the future, it is important to 
understand what exactly each of these various policy components con- 
tributed to the behavioral changes observed over the past decade. 
Whereas many researchers have studied the impact of particular poli- 
cies or subsets of policies, this paper is more ambitious in that we have 
made a major effort to compile, at the state level, measures of all the key 
policy and economic environment variables that we think may have sub- 
stantially influenced the behavior of single mothers over the 1980-2002 
period. We then merged these policy data with individual-level data from 
the March CPS from 1981 to 2003. Using these data, we developed and 
tested a model that successfully explains both the levels of and changes 
in welfare and work participation rates across states, across time, and 
across demographic groups-all without using state and year dummy 
variables-for the 1980-2002 period. 
We then used our estimated model to disentangle the contributions of 
various components of the welfare reforms, as well as other contempora- 
neous economic and policy changes, to the changes in welfare and work 
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participation rates of single mothers from 1993 to 2002. Our main find- 
ings are that the key economic and policy variables that account for the 
23-percentage-point decrease in the welfare participation rate were work 
requirements (57 percent of the decrease), the EITC (26 percent), time 
limits (11 percent), and macroeconomic conditions (7 percent). The main 
factors contributing to the 1 1-percentage-point increase in the work participa- 
tion rate of single mothers during 1993-2002 were the EITC (33 percent), 
macroeconomic conditions (25 percent), work requirements (17 percent), 
and time limits (10 percent). 
The results of the model imply some important differences across 
demographic groups in the impact of these policies. For instance, whereas 
economic conditions and the EITC largely explain the increase in work 
among relatively well educated single mothers, work requirements were a 
much more important factor for high school dropouts. This is not surpris- 
ing: since more-educated mothers presumably command higher wages, an 
enhanced EITC wage subsidy plus a stronger economy could easily push 
them over the margin from choosing welfare to choosing to work. On the 
other hand, if women who have dropped out of high school enter the labor 
market because of a binding constraint induced by work requirements, they 
are presumably made worse off. Thus how welfare reform has affected the 
well-being of high school dropout single mothers and their children is an 
important topic for future research. 
Our research also highlights the crucial difference between leaving 
welfare and going to work. A troubling development is that about one- 
quarter of the welfare leavers actually did not enter the work force. What 
are the characteristics of these people? What happens to their children's 
well-being and to their own? These, too, are important questions for future 
research. In this regard the EITC seems to be a particularly attractive 
policy because it scores high both as a factor reducing welfare participa- 
tion and as a factor increasing work. Work requirements, on the other 
hand, seem to be much more effective at getting single mothers to exit wel- 
fare than at getting them to enter market work. 
This paper has used a simple methodology to address some important 
policy questions. But we assumed the exogeneity of educational attain- 
ment, marital status, and number of children. In a life-cycle model with 
forward-looking mothers, these demographic characteristics will cer- 
tainly be endogenous. Thus yet another important topic for further 
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research is how welfare policy affects education, marriage, and fertility 
decisions.83 
Another issue is that, in a dynamic framework, not just current policy 
measures but also expected future policy measures affect current deci- 
sions. A fundamental tension in previous research on the impact of welfare 
time limits (both benefit eligibility and work requirement time limits), 
including our own work reported here, is that the incentive to bank time 
that is estimated in this work exists only if women are forward looking. 
But if women are indeed forward looking, any model that fails to include 
expected future benefits as a determinant of current choices is misspeci- 
fied, except under strong assumptions about expectations and the process 
generating future benefits. 
More concretely, it is entirely possible that some part of the welfare 
participation decline that began in the mid- 1990s occurred because single 
mothers were forward looking and anticipated that welfare participation 
would become more difficult in the future, because of some combination 
of work requirements, time limits, and reduced benefits. Anyone who 
thinks that his or her future welfare participation has become less likely, 
and future work more likely, will have a greater incentive to invest more 
in human capital today, including by working. Our modeling framework 
cannot address this point. 
Finally, the reliability of our decomposition of the roles of various fac- 
tors in reducing welfare and increasing work hinges crucially on the 
assumption that we have successfully measured and included in our analy- 
sis all the key factors involved. If we have omitted any important factor, its 
effect may be spuriously transferred to the factors that we have included. 
After months of intensive data collection, we were unable to identify other 
aspects of the policy or economic environment that we felt could plausi- 
bly be considered important. Indeed, we attempted to include a reasonable 
measure of every aspect of welfare reform and the economic environ- 
ment that Blank's 2002 survey hypothesized as potentially important.84 Of 
course, it is quite likely that some of our policy measures could be 
improved, but it is difficult to think of any key policy variables we have 
completely omitted. 
83. See Keane and Wolpin (2002a, 2002b, 2003) for some work on this topic. 
84. Blank (2002). 
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Perhaps our most plausible omission is a change in "culture"-an 
intrinsically difficult-to-quantify concept. A change in culture could take 
two forms: either a change in the culture of welfare offices toward a "wel- 
fare-to-work" emphasis, or a change in the general culture that makes 
welfare receipt somehow seem less desirable. However, we do not under- 
stand how such changes in culture could be generated except through 
such measurable things as the imposition of work requirements, stronger 
sanctions for violating work requirements, and the imposition of time lim- 
its, all of which we have measured and included. In that case it is quite 
appropriate, in a reduced-form specification, for the coefficients on these 
measurable policy instruments to pick up how they affect culture. 
APPENDIX A 
The Impact of Time Limits 
HERE WE LAY out a simple model of welfare participation decisions by 
forward-looking, wealth-maximizing agents when there are time limits. 
Suppose that a single mother has only two choices in a given month: wel- 
fare participation only (choice 0) and work only (choice 1). The value of 
each choice is given by 
W0t (S, T) = Bt + dVt+l (S- 1, T- 1) 
Wlt (S, T) =Et + dt+l (S, T - 1). 
Here Bt is the welfare benefit in month t, and Et is the earnings (deter- 
mined by her wage offer net of the cost of working) the woman can obtain 
if she works. The term Vt+1(S, T) denotes the expected present value of 
lifetime wealth at time t + 1 given that the woman has S months of eligi- 
bility that may be spread over a T-month horizon. The term WOt(S, T) 
denotes the value of participating in welfare (choice 0) at time t, given 
that the woman has S months of eligibility that may be spread over a 
T-month horizon. This equals the current welfare benefit the woman will 
receive, Bt, plus the discount factor d E (0, 1) times Vt)+(S - 1, T - 1), 
which is the woman's expected present value of lifetime wealth at time 
t + 1 given that she has chosen to be on welfare at t. Note that the first 
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argument of this function is S - 1, since if the woman accepts welfare 
today, she will have only S - 1 periods of eligibility left when she gets to 
the next period. Similarly, WJt(S, T) denotes the value of working only 
(choice 1). This equals the current earnings the woman will obtain from 
working, Et, plus the discount factor d times Vt+1(S, T - 1), the woman's 
expected present value of lifetime wealth at time t + 1 given that she has 
chosen to work and not be on welfare at t. Note that the first argument of 
this function is S, since if the woman does not go on welfare today, she 
will still have S periods of eligibility left when she gets to the next period. 
A key point is that Vt+1(S, T- 1) > Vt+1(S - 1, T- 1) as long as S < T. 
That is, one is better off if one gets to time t + 1 with more available 
months of eligibility remaining. Optimal behavior in this model is to try 
to time the use of one's S periods of potential welfare participation eligi- 
bility to coincide with those periods when the realization of Et is relatively 
low. Define Dt+1(S, T) = d[Vt+1(S, T - 1) - Vt+1(S - 1, T - 1)] ? 0 as the 
"option value" of preserving a month of welfare eligibility. The optimal 
decision rule for working in this model is to work if 
Wlt(S,T) - Wot(S,T) = Et-Bt+Dt+1(S,T) > 0. 
Or, more intuitively, 
Et + Dt+1(S, T) > Bt. 
The main point is that it is not optimal to choose welfare over work just 
because Bt > Et. In fact, Bt must exceed Et by an increment at least as great 
as the option value of saving a month of eligibility, Dt+1(S, T), in order for 
it to be optimal to choose welfare. This is the basic intuition for why time 
limits would be expected to reduce welfare participation, even before 
people have reached the limit. 
Things get more complex if we add the option of working and partici- 
pating in welfare at the same time (choice 2). The value of this option is 
W2t(S,T) = Bt + (1-t)Et + dVt+l(S-1,T-1), 
where X is the rate at which earnings are taxed in the welfare benefit for- 
mula. Now, in order for it to be optimal not to participate in welfare, a 
second condition must hold. It must also be the case that 
W1(S,T) - W2t(S,T) = tEt - Bt + Dt+1(S,T) > 0. 
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By working only (choice 1) rather than working and going on wel- 
fare (choice 2), a woman gains tE, and loses B. Equivalently but more 
intuitively, 
TEt + Dt+I (S, T) > Bt. 
As the benefit tax rate approaches 0, it becomes less likely that this con- 
dition will be satisfied. In fact, as X -X 0, the condition approaches D,+1 
(S, T) > Bt, and the woman would always choose welfare. To see this, 
note that the largest possible value of Dt+1(S, T) occurs when S = 1 and 
the woman is certain that she will choose to participate in welfare at t + 1. 
In that case Dt+1(S, T) = dBt, since, by using up the month of eligibility, 
she loses Bt with certainty next month. Thus the condition becomes dBt 
> Dt+1(S, T) > Bt, which is impossible for d < 1. This further implies that 
there exists some X > 0 such that it is never optimal to "bank" years of eli- 
gibility if X < ? . 
We also point out that Dt+1(S, T) will be decreasing in the pool of 
extensions, decreasing in the fraction of benefits one continues to receive 
after reaching the time limit, increasing in the likelihood of future un- 
employment, increasing in the level of benefits, and decreasing in the prob- 
ability of marriage (or any other event or change in variable that would 
reduce the probability of participating in welfare in the future). Thus we 
should interact indicators for time limits with any variables that help deter- 
mine the above quantities (for example, education could affect the proba- 
bility of unemployment). 
The idea that time limits could have played a major role in the decline 
of welfare caseloads in the early TANF period of 1996-2001 rests on the 
presumption that the anticipatory effect is substantial, since few people 
were subject to binding time limits before 2002. But it strikes us as implau- 
sible that the effect of time limits could have been substantial, given how 
TANF was actually implemented. The very simple analysis of the antici- 
patory effect presented above ignores several crucial features of actual 
state TANF plans. Most obviously, we have noted that a large percentage 
of the caseload resided in states that did not enforce a time limit or that 
stopped the clock for working participants. Other features of many actual 
state plans that reduce the option value of banking months of eligibility 
include generous earnings disregards for employed TANF participants, 
and rather modest partial benefit reductions when the time limit is reached. 
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The ways in which partial benefit reductions and generous treatment of 
earned income reduce incentives to bank time can be clarified using some 
simple numerical examples, which also help elucidate how the AFDC/ 
TANF benefit formulas work. For example, in Illinois the monthly TANF 
benefit for a family of three with no income is $377, and the benefit reduc- 
tion rate is 33 percent of earnings. A woman working 130 hours a month at 
$6.00 an hour would be taxed $257 (ignoring work expense deductions), 
leaving $120 per month in TANF benefits if she decided to participate. In 
principle, there might be an incentive to pass up the $120 in order to pre- 
serve eligibility to get the full $377 in some future month, if the woman 
thought it likely that she would face some future protracted unemployment 
spell. But in Illinois, if a woman works while receiving welfare, that time 
is not counted against the clock, so there is no such incentive. 
Even if work did not stop the clock, it is not at all clear that banking the 
month would be optimal in this situation. It could be optimal to pass up a 
certain $120 today in favor of $377 at some hypothetical future point only 
if the probability of future unemployment were quite high. For example, a 
just-divorced woman with an 8-year-old child facing this choice in a state 
with a five-year time limit should only begin to consider passing up the 
$120 today if she feels there is a nonnegligible probability that she will be 
unable to find work for five years out of the next ten (her time horizon 
until the child reaches 18). Otherwise there is almost no chance she will 
ever be able to use the banked time. Accounting for discounting or for the 
fact that she might remarry in the future would further diminish the option 
value to preserving months of eligibility. 
Some states have even more generous earnings disregards. For exam- 
ple, Connecticut exempts 100 percent of earnings up to the point where 
total income from work and benefits reaches the poverty line. Under this 
system there is no incentive whatsoever to bank months, so long as the 
person can save and the sum of earnings plus benefits does not exceed the 
poverty line. As long as she discounts future income, a woman in the cir- 
cumstances described above and living in Connecticut should prefer to 
take her TANF benefits now rather than later. Apparently, the participants 
and caseworkers in Connecticut realized this. According to Bloom and 
others (2002, p. 133), "Surveys of recipients and staff [in Connecticut] 
found that workers did not actively encourage most recipients to leave 
welfare quickly in order to bank their months of eligibility. In fact, such a 
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message would not have been credible.... Individuals who found employ- 
ment would usually continue to receive their full welfare grant.... Thus, 
in order to bank months, a recipient would need to give up $543 per 
month in benefits." 
As another example, California has a five-year time limit, but the only 
penalty for reaching the limit is loss of the adult portion of benefits. In 
2000 the maximum TANF benefit for a family of three was $626 a month, 
whereas that for a family of two was $505 a month. So the penalty is the 
loss of only $121 a month. No one would pass up $626 today just to pre- 
serve eligibility for an additional $121 in some future month. 
Does the option to work while on welfare change the calculation? 
California disregards the first $225 of monthly earnings, plus 50 percent 
of earnings beyond that. Thus, if a woman could earn $780 a month, her 
benefit reduction would be $278. This gives a three-person-family benefit 
of $626 - $278 = $348, and a two-person-family benefit of $505 - $278 
= $227. Could it ever be optimal to give up $348 today to preserve eligi- 
bility for a benefit of $348 rather than $227 in some future month? That 
would mean reducing this month's income from $1,128 to $780, in order 
to have an income of $348 instead of $227 in the event of some future 
month of unemployment. One could devise a numerical example in which 
such a choice would be optimal, by ruling out saving, making marginal util- 
ity diminishing extremely strongly in income, making the risk of future un- 
employment very high, and ruling out any other sources of support when 
unemployed. But such a scenario seems quite implausible. 
To summarize, time limits may make the option of working (and stay- 
ing off welfare) more attractive relative to welfare by adding an extra ele- 
ment to the value of working, namely, the option value of preserving a 
future month of welfare eligibility. But, in states with generous earnings 
disregards and in states that only reduce (rather than eliminate) benefits 
when the limit is reached, this option value is likely to be small relative to 
the current TANF benefits that one would have to pass up in order to bank 
a month of eligibility. Thus, as a practical matter, we expect that any 
anticipatory effects of time limits in most existing state TANF plans 
should have been small. 
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APPENDIX B 
Effects of Maintenance-of-Effort Requirements 
THE MAINTENANCE-OF-EFFORT provision in Section 409 of PRWORA 
stipulates that the Department of Health and Human Services may reduce 
a state's federal TANF block grant if the state fails to maintain its level of 
assistance for needy families at 75 percent of the historical level.85 The 
"historical level" was defined as peak-year (usually 1994) spending on the 
whole range of programs replaced by TANF (such as AFDC and AFDC- 
related child care). This feature was designed to prevent a feared "race 
to the bottom," in which many states might start to cut assistance once 
federal AFDC matching funds vanished. 
But the MOE requirement has had some dramatic and unexpected 
consequences. The critical feature of the MOE requirement was that 
"qualified" expenditures were defined as including not just cash assis- 
tance paid through TANF, but a range of non-TANF spending as well. 
These alternatives included child care assistance and educational and job 
training activities. Critically, such benefits could be paid to any low- 
income family, even if they were not TANF recipients. As welfare case- 
loads dropped dramatically after 1996, causing expenditure on TANF 
cash assistance to fall, the states were essentially forced by the MOE 
requirement to redirect money into other qualified programs. To a great 
extent, the states responded by funneling substantial resources into sub- 
sidized day care for low-income families (U.S. General Accounting 
Office, 1998c). The effect can be seen in figure 4 in the text, which 
shows the increase in CCDF expenditure from roughly $3.0 billion in 
1995 to $8.0 billion in 2001. 
Since child care is obviously one of the most important costs of work- 
ing for single mothers with young children, the increase in child care 
subsidies after 1996 should have provided enhanced work incentives for 
this group. Interestingly, the MOE requirement can thus create a feed- 
back loop that perpetuates the impact of welfare reform. That is, welfare 
reforms that reduce caseloads and encourage work cause state spending 
85. If a state failed to achieve a required work participation rate for its welfare partici- 
pants, the MOE requirement could be raised to 85 percent. The work requirement was 
reduced if a state achieved certain caseload reduction targets. Since caseloads fell so dra- 
matically, these caseload reduction credits rendered the work requirement targets essen- 
tially irrelevant until recently. 
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on cash assistance to fall. This in turn induces states to spend more on 
day care and other work expense subsidies, which causes caseloads to 
drop further, in a virtuous cycle. Also interesting is that the MOE rule 
can create a situation of multiple equilibria, with high state welfare case- 
loads and low work expense subsidies in one equilibrium, and low case- 
loads and high subsidies in the other. Moreover, the high-subsidy 
equilibrium is fiscally sustainable because welfare spending is low. We 
formalize this argument below and show that, under plausible assump- 
tions about the dynamics of states' budget processes, the equilibrium 
with high child care subsidies and low welfare participation is the only 
stable equilibrium. 
Our model of the effect of the MOE clause on welfare caseloads can be 
described as follows: Suppose that there is a continuum of single mothers 
with measure 1 in the population. In every period, single mothers receive 
a job offer with wages (net of the cost of working) independently drawn 
from a distribution F, and each decides whether or not to work. If a 
woman works, she obtains her net wage draw, and she may receive a child 
care subsidy s > 0 from the state government. If she chooses not to work, 
she receives welfare payment z > 0. Thus a woman will work if and only 
if w + s > z, or w > z - s. Given the policy variable pair (z, s), the total 
measure of women participating in welfare is F(z - s). 
Following the spirit of the MOE requirement of PRWORA, we assume 
that the state is required to spend a total of B > 0 on assistance to single 
mothers. We assume that the welfare assistance level z is fixed through 
time. As the law stipulates, the state government's expenditure on both 
cash welfare assistance and child care subsidies to low-income women 
both qualify as MOE expenditure. Thus, for a fixed z, any level of s that 
satisfies 
zF(z-s) + s[I-F(z-s)] = B 
will constitute an equilibrium. Depending on the level of B, multiple levels 
of s may be consistent with equilibrium (see figure B 1 for an illustration). 
Now we assume that a state's fiscal allocation is determined in an 
adaptive fashion as follows. Suppose that, in period t, the state's welfare 
caseload is given by F(z - st), so that the cash welfare expenditure is 
zF(z - st). Then, in period t + 1, the government will adjust its child care 
subsidy s,1 according to 
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Figure Bi. Possible Multiple Equilibria 
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Source: Authors' model described in the text. 
B-zF(Z-st) t+1 I1-F(z-st) 
That is, we assume that the state sets the child care subsidy for period t + 1 
to ensure that the MOE spending amount B is satisfied under the myopic 
assumption that the number of people who work in period t + 1 will remain 
the same as in period t. Although we do not have direct evidence for this 
particular specification of the fiscal dynamics, it is certainly plausible. 
Under reasonable assumptions about the shape of F, the system will have 
two equilibria, and only the one with the higher level of child care subsidy 
is stable. Therefore, under the MOE requirement clause, any initial shock 
experienced by the economy, such as the booming macroeconomy begin- 
ning in 1996, will lead the system to converge to an equilibrium with a 
high child care subsidy and low welfare participation. This equilibrium 
Pareto-dominates the other equilibrium with a low child care subsidy and 
high welfare participation (figure B2). 
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Figure B2. Stable Equilibrium 
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Source: Authors' model described in the text. 
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APPENDIX C 
Variables Used in the Analysis 
Table Cl. Description of Variables 
Variable Description 
Dependent variables 
WEL_RECEIPTist Categorical variable indicating whether woman i 
received welfare during period t 
WORKi,t Categorical variable indicating whether woman i 
worked at least part time during period t 
Individual-level demographic variables 
AGEist Continuous variable indicating age of woman i in years 
RACEist Categorical variable indicating white, black, or other 
EDUist Categorical variable indicating educational attainment 
(less than high school, finished high school, some 
college, or finished college) 
MARITAList Categorical variable indicating never married, divorced, 
separated, or widowed 
URBANist Categorical variable indicating urban or rural residence 
NCHILD05ist, NCHILD612ist Number of children of woman i younger than 6, between 
NCHILD1317i,, 6 and 12, or between 13 and 17, respectively 
DCHILD05jst, DCHILS612ist Dummy variable indicating whether any child of woman 
i is younger than 6 or between 6 and 12, respectively 
YOUNGESTist, OLDESTist Age of youngest or oldest child of woman i, respectively 
Individual-level policy variables 
WELFARE_BENis, Real AFDC or TANF maximum benefit (assuming zero 
earnings) received by woman i, calculated using her 
state' s benefit rule and her family composition 
FOOD_STAMPi,, Real food stamp benefits, taking into account that 
welfare benefits count toward income 
EITC_RATE_., EITC-MAXist EITC phase-in rate and real maximum EITC amount, 
constructed from both federal and state EITC rules, 
together with family composition 
INC_EXEMPTION,i, Exemption amount for federal income tax; constructed 
from personal exemption times the number of people 
in the family, plus the standard eduction 
SWRist Fraction of year t woman i may be subject to the 
state' s work requirement, constructed from state's 
work requirement time limits, child age 
exemptions, and family composition 
DTL_HITist Dummy variable indicating whether woman i would 
have hit her time limit for welfare receipt 
MONTH_SINCE_TL_HITist Time elapsed since woman i may potentially have 
become subject to time limit 
(continued) 
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Table Cl. Description of Variables (continued) 
Variable Description 
MONTH_SINCE_WR_HITist Cumulative time elapsed since woman i may potentially 
have become subject o work requirement 
REMAINING_TL_ELIGist Maximum potential remaining length of woman 
i's time limit, constructed by TL_LENGTHst- 
min{MONTH_SINCE_TL_STARTs, 
OLDESTiS, 121 
REMAINING_CHILD_ELIG,st Remaining length of time woman i may be 
categorically eligible for welfare benefits, 
constructed from 18-YOUNGESTi., 
MEDICAID_PCTist Percentage of woman i's children covered by 
Medicaid expansion, constructed from her family 
composition and her state's Medicaid and/or 
SCHIP expansion 
MEDICAID_FPList Medicaid expansion eligibility income threshold for 
woman i's youngest child 
State-level policy and economic variables 
DTLS, Dummy variable indicating whether state s had time 
limit in place at year t, under either waiver 
TL_LENGTHst Length of time limit in state s 
MONTH_SINCE_TL_STARTs, Months elapsed since implementation of time limits, 
under either waiver or TANF 
DCHILDBENs, Dummy variable indicating whether child portion of 
welfare benefit continues after time limits are 
exhausted 
FIXED_DISREGARD,t Fixed amount of earnings disregarded in calculating 
AFDC/TANF benefit levels 
BBRKt Benefit reduction rate (incorporates "permanent" 
percent income disregard) 
DWORKREQst Dummy variable indicating whether state s has work 
requirement in place at year t, under either waiver 
or TANF 
LENGTH_WR_TLst Length of work requirement time limit 
MONTH_SINCE_WR_STARTs, Months elapsed since implementation of work require- 
ment time limits, under either waiver or TANF 
CHILD_EXEMP_AGEst Age of youngest child below which the mother will 
be exempted from work requirement 
N_WR_EXEMPTIONst Number of work requirement exemptions 
DFULLSANCTIONst Dummy variable indicating whether state s has an 
ultimate full sanction when work requirement is 
not satisfied 
CHILDSUPPORT_ENFORCEst Child support enforcement expenditure in year t per 
single mother 
CHILDCAREst Child care subsidy expenditure in year t per 
single mother 
(continued) 
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Table Cl. Description of Variables (continued) 
Variable Description 
WAGE20Qt Real hourly wage rate at the 20th percentile of the 
wage distribution 
UNEMPLOYMENT,t State unemployment rate 
DIVERSION,t Dummy indicating whether state s has a diversion 
program 
Federal-level policy variables 
MIN_WAGEt Real federal minimum hourly wage 
INCTAX_RATEt Federal income tax rate applying to lowest bracket 
Sources: See text for a description of the data sources. 
Table C2. Interaction Terms Used in the Empirical Specification 
Policy variable Interaction terms 
Variables related to time limits 
DTL,t TL_LENGTHs,, DTL_HITi.t DCHILDBEN,t 
REMAINING_TL_ELIGi.t WELFARE_BENi.t WELFARE_BENi,t x EDUj,, 





x WELFARE-BENis, x EDUist] 
[REMAINING_CHILD_ELIGist x AGE,j] 
[REMAINING_CHILD_ELIGist x MARITALi,j] 
[REMAINING-CHILD-ELIGist x EDUjj] 





MONTH_SINCE_TL_STARTst AGEist, MARITAList, EDUist, RACEi,t 
MONTH_SINCE_TL_HITist [AGEist, MARITAList, EDUist, RACE,,] 
Variables related to work requirements 
DWORKREQst LENGTH-WR-TLst 
SWRist AGEist, MARITAList, EDUist RACEj,, 
[NCHILD05ist, NCHILD612ist] 
[WELFARE_BENist WELFARE_BENi,, x EDU,j] 
DFULLSANCTIONst N_WR_EXEMPTIONst 
[UNEMPLOYMENTst, UNEMPLOYMENTs(t 1)] 
MONTH_SINCE_WR_STARTst [AGEist, MARITAList EDUist, RACE,.,] 
MONTH_SINCE_WR_HITist AGEist, MARITAList, EDUist RACEist 
(continued) 
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Table C2. Interaction Terms Used in the Empirical Specification (continued) 
Policy variable Interaction terms 
Variables related to EITC 
EITC-RATEW [WAGE20Qt, UNEMPLOYMENT,t, 
UNEMPLOYMENT,(t,,)] 
EITC_MAXist [SWRist, DTList] 
AGEist MARITAList EDUist RACEi,t 
Variables related to child care 
CHILDCAREst NCHILD05j, NCHILD612ist, AGEist, MARITALjS,t 
EDUistg RACEist 
[UNEMPLOYMENTst, UNEMPLOYMENTs(,,I)] 
DCHILDO5ist x AGEist DCHILD05i5t 
x MARITAList 
DCHILDO5ist x EDUist DCHILDO5ist x RACEist 
[DCHILDO5ist x UNEMPLOYMENTWt] 
[DCHILDO5is, x UNEMPLOYMENTS(t I)] 
DCHILD612ist, AGEist DCHILD612ist 
x MARITAList, DCHILD612ist x EDUist 
DCHILD612ist x RACEist 
[DCHILD612i1, x UNEMPLOYMENTs/9 
DCHILD612is, x UNEMPLOYMENTs(Q 1)] 
Variables related to AFDC/TANF benefit levels 
WELFARE_BENist [WAGE20st, UNEMPLOYMENTst 
UNEMPLOYMENTs(t-I)] 
[SWRist DTLst] 
AGEist, MARITAList EDUist RACEist 
BBRst [AGE i, MARITAList EDUist RACEist] 
Variables related to food stamps 
FOOD_STAMPist [AGEjst, MARITAList EDUist RACEist] 
Variables related to child support enforcement expenditure 
CHILDSUPPORT_ENFORCEst [AGEist MARITAList EDUist RACEist] 
[NCHILD05ist, NCHILD612ist] 
Variables related to Medicaid 
MEDICAID_PCTist [AGEist MARITAList EDUist RACEist] 
[NCHILD05ist NCHILD612ist] 
Source: See text for a description of the data sources. 
a. Bracketed terms are omitted from the "sparse" specification. 
